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ABSTRACT 
While the relationship between the expression of positive emotion and 
likability has been established, the relationship between the expression of 
positive emotion and the experience of positive emotion during the 
employment of ingratiation strategies is unclear. In the present study, this 
relationship was investigated in a sample of adolescent females, aged eleven to 
eighteen years. After either a positive or neutral mood induction procedure, 
participants were instructed to ingratiate themselves with a confederate. 
Participants' positive emotional expression and likability were rated by 
themselves and by the confederate after the interaction. In addition, 
participants listed their thoughts and feelings while planning their ingratiation 
strategies, and again after the interaction. Each interaction was videotaped and 
subsequently rated by an independent observer. The relationship between 
experienced and expressed emotion was posited to be a function of, among 
other variables, positive emotional states occurring during social interaction, 
the self-regulation of emotion and cognitive developmental factors. The main 
empirical results of this study can be as summarised as follows: the mood 
induction procedure was successful; the mood of participants in the neutral 
mood condition became elevated during the interaction task; the measure of 
positive emotion expression predicted liking for all three raters; both the 
confederate and observer rated the older participants higher than the younger 
participants on the expression of positive emotion; the consensus between 
participants' self-ratings of positive emotion expression and the confederate 
and observer's ratings of the same was lowest in the youngest age category and 
higher in each older category. Some of these results are consistent with other 
studies of ingratiation, while other results clarify relationships that have not 
hitherto been investigated. Results are discussed in terms of intra- and 
interpersonal processes, and an integrated explanatory model of the 
ingratiation system is developed. Implications of this study are discussed with 
reference to future research. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The secret of life is never to have an emotion that is unbecoming. 
- Oscar Wilde, A Woman of No Importance. 
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The study of self-presentation, or impression management, strategies has 
long held the interest of theorists and researchers in social psychology (Gordon, 
1996). Jones and Pittman (1982) proposed that self-presentation involves an 
actor's shaping of his or her responses to create in specific others an impression 
that is, for one reason or another, desired by the actor. They maintained that 
most of these reasons can be subsumed under an interest in augmenting or 
maintaining power in a relationship, and therefore re-defined strategic self-
presentation as those features of behavior affected by power augmentation 
motives designed to elicit or shape others' attributions of the actor's 
dispositions. Five classes of self-presentational strategies have been proposed 
by Jones and Pittman, namely: ingratiation, intimidation, self-promotion, 
exemplification and supplication. Since ingratiation is a specific form of self-
presentation, they defined ingratiation as an attempt to induce the attribution of 
liking in the target. 
1.1 Part One: Ingratiation and emotion 
1.1.1 Ingratiation as a self-presentational strategy 
The ubiquitous nature of ingratiation (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Gordon, 1996; 
Jones & Pittman, 1982) has made it an important research topic, and various 
factors that make people likable to others have been researched. For example, 
people who display consistency in their beliefs and their behavior are 
considered more likable than those who do not (Tedeschi, Schlenker & Bonoma, 
1971 ); people who conform to situational norms are considered more likable 
than those who do not (Alexander & Knight, 1971); people who use indirect 
flattery, for example, imitating others, talking about their favourite topics, even 
simply paying attention to them and using their names, are considered more 
likable than those who do not (Schlenker & Goldman, 1982); people whose 
verbal and nonverbal behaviors match are considered more likable than those 
whose verbal and nonverbal behaviors do not (DePaulo,1992); those who 
express positive emotions, for example, happiness, are considered more likable 
than those who express no particular emotion at all (Clark & Taraban, 1991). 
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It is the last of these factors that forms the focus of the present research. The 
use of positive emotional expression as an ingratiation strategy has received 
some research attention (Baumeister, 1982; Clark, Pataki & Carver, 1996; 
DePaulo, 1992; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Forgas, 1996; Hochschild, 1983). However, 
an immediate problem arises from this area of research. Researchers contend 
that people who are warm, understanding, happy, compassionate, reliable and 
charming are likable (Clark et al 1996; Jones, 1990; Jones & Pittman, 1982), but 
there is some sliding between the possession of such attributes or emotional 
states and their expression. For example, Clark et al., (1996) state, "people do 
like others who are feeling happy more than they like those expressing no 
particular emotion" (p. 249, emphasis added). The implicit assumption in this 
statement is that feeling happy is the sa..me as expressing happiness. However, 
experimental evidence shows that expressing an emotion does not necessarily 
entail the experience of that emotion (e.g., Wagner, Buck & Winterbotham, 
1993). Wagner et al. found that happiness and interest are often mentioned in 
self-reports and displayed in expressive behavior, but that these reports and 
expressions are not necessarily related to the subjective experience of these 
emotions. In other words, it is possible to appear happy while not necessarily 
feeling happy, and there is an important distinction to be made between the 
experience and expression of emotion. 
On the other hand, those researchers who support the Facial Feedback 
Hypothesis, including Buck (1980), Cappella (1993), Laird (1984), and Winton 
(1986), would claim that muscular/neurological feedback from facial 
expressions influences both emotion and cognition. Evidence for a causal link 
between the facial expression of positive emotion and the subsequent 
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experience of that emotion has been provided by many researchers, including 
Adelman & Zajonc (1989), Cappella (1993) and Hess, Kappas, McHugo and 
Lanzetta (1992). Laird (1974) showed how posed smiles (even when the person 
is instructed to adopt a particular set of facial postures without using the word 
"smile") lead to more positive evaluations of humor in cartoons. Whether there 
is a direct relationship between facial expression and emotion (Izard, 1977), or 
whether that relationship is mediated by cognition (Laird, 1984), the facial 
feedback hypothesis proposes a causal link between the expression of an 
emotion and the experience of that emotion. Cappella (1993) found that 
partners in an interaction imitate each other's smiles, and that there is an 
independent effect of a person's own smiles on his or her own attraction to the 
partner. So, feeling positive, via facial feedback from smiling, affects the way 
that one views the attractiveness of others. Cappella (1993) proposed the 
existence of a causally related expressive and experiential emotional subsystem 
within each person. When two persons are involved in social interaction, an 
affective loop is created between the people, involving the subsystems of both. 
For Cappella, the reciprocal imitation of facial expression provides the link 
between the two subsystems in a dyad. 
The research on the links between experienced and expressed emotion in 
social interaction is sparse and, thus, the present research investigated the 
relationship between experienced and expressed positive emotion in 
participants engaged in an ingratiation task Participants were presented with 
an ingratiation task in which they were instructed to try and get another person 
to like them without making this goal explicit. By using mood induction 
techniques, it was possible to investigate the effects of participants' mood on 
their perceptions of how much a stranger liked them, and how much the 
stranger did actually like them. In addition, it was possible to investigate the 
relationship between expressed and experienced emotion during the 
ingratiation task 
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1.1.2 The relationship between expressed positive emotion and liking 
The link between expressed positive emotion and being liked has been 
clearly established. There is much evidence to suggest that people who express 
positive emotion are more likable than those who express negative emotion, 
even in situations where perceivers are simply given information about others 
(including their emotional state), rather than actually engaging in an 
interaction, and asked to make judgements of liking (Clark & Taraban, 1991; 
Forgas, O'Connor & Morris, 1983; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson & O'Connor, 1987; 
Sommers, 1984). Relatedly, anxiety and depression compromise the expression 
of positive emotion, and diminish liking (see summary of evidence in Fiske and 
Taylor, 1991). An experiment by Berry and Hansen (1996) investigated the 
relationship between the experience of positive emotion and liking. Dyads of 
strangers (undergraduate women) were videotaped while they were alone 
together in a waiting room. The participants immediately evaluated the 
interaction with reference to positive affective dimensions, for example, 
enjoyment, relaxed, pleasant, satisfying and liking. Significant correlations were 
obtained between members' ratings of the affective dimensions. Participants 
also rated themselves on the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), 
from which the experimenters obtained a score of trait positive affect (PA) for 
each participant. Participants' PA levels were positively and significantly 
related to both self and partner ratings of the quality of the interactions in 
which they engaged. Interactions involving high PA individuals were 
evaluated more positively by independent observers than were interactions in 
which low PA participants took part. High PA individuals perceived their own 
interactions to be more enjoyable, comfortable and pleasant than did low PA 
people. Participants' level of PA predicted their partners' evaluations as well as 
impressions of their videotaped interactions provided by judges who were not 
acquainted with them. While this study examined the relationship between self-
ratings of positive affective experience (PANAS) with the positive qualities of 
social interaction including liking, there were no ratings taken of the emotional 
expressions produced by the participants. It would have been interesting to 
know whether, if participants had rated each other on dimensions of positive 
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affect, these ratings would have correlated positively with participants' self-
ratings of positive affective expression and ratings of liking. Knowledge of such 
a positive relationship would help to clarify the relationship between 
experienced and expressed emotion in social encounters. 
Jones and Pittman (1982) and Jones (1990) contended that people like others 
who possess such positive attributes as warmth, understanding and 
compassion and proposed that positive emotional cues to such attributes as 
warmth, humour, reliability and charm make people likable. However, the 
possession of such attributes needs some expression for others to know that 
they are present, since perceivers cannot infer the presence (or absence) of these 
attributes without cues to their presence. Perceivers infer that actors possess 
these positive attributes ( or do not possess them) from the verbal and non-
verbal cues provided by the actors. The available information about another's 
emotional state is usually in the form of the other's appearance and behaviors, 
and from these cues perceivers can make inferences about the mental states and 
dispositions of others. For example, Planalp, Defrancisco and Rutherford (1996) 
found that people use a variety of cues to detect and identify emotion in others, 
including vocal cues, facial cues, indirect verbal cues and direct verbal cues 
(noted in their study as being very rare), body movement or position, 
physiological cues like rapid breathing or crying, cues based on the context in 
which the emotion occurred, and trait cues. Further, a variety of particular cues 
are associated with particular attributes, for example, smiling is associated with 
a friendly attitude (Van Hoof£, 1972); certain facial expressions are associated 
with confusion (Allen & Atkinson, 1978); hand movements, eye contact and 
mouth movements can be used as cues to anxiety (Waxer, 1977), and accurate 
inferences about emotional states and personality traits can be made from non-
verbal cues (Cunningham, 1977; Edelman & Hampson, 1981; Scherer, 1986; 
Zuckerman, Larrance, Hall, DeFrank & Rosenthal, 1979). Clearly, people can 
use verbal and non-verbal cues from which to infer the emotional states and 
personality traits of others, and the detection of cues associated with positive 
emotion in an actor leads to increased liking by the perceiver. That is not to say 
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that there is a one-to-one relationship between expressions and emotions, but 
only to suggest that emotional cues are used in the inferences that people make 
about the emotional states and traits of others. 
If it is only by the expression of emotion cues that actors are able to inform 
others of their own emotional experience, then the level of expression must play 
a part in this transfer of information. When emotion cues are very subtle or 
difficult to detect, the perceiver will have trouble identifying the emotional state 
of the actor. It is, therefore, not surprising that expressive people are liked 
better than unexpressive people (DePaulo, 1992). This is a highly replicable 
finding, which has been documented for people who are spontaneously 
expressive (Sabatelli & Rubin, 1986), for those who are skilled at posing 
nonverbal expressions (Friedman, DiMatteo & Taranta, 1980), for those who 
describe themselves as emotionally expressive (Friedman, Riggio & Casella, 
1988) or as extraverted (Riggio & Friedman, 1986), for people who are from 
expressive families (Halberstadt, 1984), and for people who have expressive 
facial features (Cunningham, 1986). Expressive people also appear more 
attractive than unexpressive people (DePaulo, Blank, Swaim & Hairfield, 1992; 
Friedman et al, 1988; Larrance & Zuckerman, 1981; Riggio, 1986; Sabatelli & 
Rubin, 1986). 
In attempting to relate expressive behaviors to impression management 
strategies, Jones and Pittman (1982) made the point that it is unlikely that there 
is a given response set that is intrinsically or universally self-presentational. 
They summarised actions that are relatively unmotivated by concern about 
others' impressions as follows: those behaviors that are task-centred (that is, 
being engrossed in the task, the actor is unconcerned with the responses of 
perceivers); that are spontaneously expressive (at, or near the moment of their 
experience, anger, mirth or joy may overwhelm the concerns of impression 
management); that are normatively ritualised (actors may forego the self-
presentational possibilities of routine exchanges, for example, checking out 
library books or buying groceries); or that are deliberately self-disclosing (for 
example, therapy sessions or intimate relationships). A feature of behaviors 
typically associated with ingratiation is interest in the other person, cued by 
smiling, leaning forward, or asking about the other. It is by no means implied 
that strategic self-presentational features are necessarily false, distorted or 
seriously discrepant from the phenomenal self. Jones and Pittman argued that 
such features typically involve selective disclosures and omissions, matters of 
emphasis and toning rather than of deceit or simulation. Similarly, DePaulo 
(1992) proposed that people edit the images of themselves rather than attempt 
to portray images that are totally uncharacteristic of themselves. 
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Jones and Wortman (1973) called ingratiation behaviors "illicit" because 
they go beyond routine politeness or mere obedience to the social norms that 
govern civil discourse. While these behavioral features are labelled 
"ingratiation", the perception by a target of ingratiation that these features of 
behavior are being deliberately performed for the purposes of ingratiation 
defeats their purpose. Ingratiation that becomes entirely transparent is not 
successful in increasing a target's liking for the ingratiator. In a substantial 
meta-analysis of i.itgratiation studies, Gordon (1996) found a negative 
correlation between transparency and the effect size of ingratiation techniques, 
supporting the idea that increased transparency decreased the success of 
ingratiation. Thus, the ingratiator has a dilemma - how to ingratiate oneself 
with another person without their realising that one is doing so. The target also 
has a dilemma - whether to accept the ingratiator' s positive expressions as 
genuine or to suspect that they are exaggerated in an attempt to make the target 
like him or her. Successful ingratiation depends, to a large extent, on the ability 
of the actor to express enough positive emotion to enable the target to pick up 
the cues, while ensuring that the expression is suitably titrated to prevent 
detection of an obvious strategy. The dilemmas of both parties produce what 
Jones and Wortman (1973) called the "autistic conspiracy". A tantalising 
conspiracy of cognitive avoidance is common to ingratiators and their targets. 
The actors do not wish to see themselves as ingratiating; the target also wants to 
believe that the ingratiator is sincere. In order to investigate the tendency of 
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targets to believe that the ingratiator is sincere, experiments summarised in 
Jones and Wortman (1973) compared the reaction of those who were the targets 
of ingratiation attempts with those who were bystanders or observers. Such 
comparisons invariably showed that the targets of ingratiation strategies were 
more likely to consider such tactics authentic than were those bystanders for 
whom the particular ingratiating overtures were not intended, supporting the 
notion that the target of ingratiation wants to believe that the ingratiator is 
sincere. 
In spite of the assistance of the autistic conspiracy in ingratiation strategies, 
evidence that people who express positivity are more likable to others than 
those who do not, suggests that it might be an effective strategy to express 
positivity in order to be liked. Jones and Pittman (1982) proposed that people 
know that the expression of positive emotion usually makes one likable. To 
provide support for the proposition that people deliberately attempt to present 
themselves as positive when trying to get others to like them, Clark (1993) gave 
participants the task of getting another person to like them as much as possible. 
Participants were asked to fill out a background form for the other person; 
included in this form was a indicator of mood. Results indicated (when 
compared with the baseline mood rating taken before the experiment) that 
participants exaggerated their positive mood on the form, possibly attempting 
to portray positivity to the target person in order to be liked. 
Similarly, in one condition of a study that attempted to distinguish 
ingratiation strategies from self-promotion strategies, Godfrey, Jones and Lord 
(1986) instructed participants to try and make another person like them during 
a social interaction. The researchers asked the participants to write down the 
strategies they would use in this ingratiation task The strategies judged by 
participants to be the best for being liked almost invariably included showing 
interest in the other person and drawing the person out, displaying such 
positive "approach" gestures as smiles, nods and eye contact; and displaying 
such positive emotions as warmth, compassion and cheerfulness. Later, these 
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researchers asked participants to list the strategies they had planned and those 
they had actually used in an attempt to get another person to like them. The 
researchers had independent raters rate the participants for those behaviors 
they had planned to employ. The results showed that participants had done 
what they said they would do. They nodded, smiled and gazed at the other 
person, and questioned, encouraged, agreed with, flattered and complimented 
the partner, these actions all being interpreted as signs of warmth and 
compassion. These behaviors correlated positively with the targets' liking 
ratings. While the two last-mentioned studies investigated the expressions of 
emotion employed by participants during an ingratiation task, the relationship 
between the expression of such positive emotions as happiness, warmth and 
compassion and the emotions experienced by the participants at the time were 
not investigated. It would have been interesting to know what emotional states 
accompanied those emotional expressions, and whether congruence between 
the two would have made any difference to the liking ratings of the targets. 
In contrast to the deliberate expression of positive emotion in the above 
studies, an experiment by Erber, Wegner & Therriault (1996) found that 
participants attempted to neutralise their emotions (the participants had either 
a happy or sad mood induction) in anticipation of a social interaction. 
However, this study has some limitations in its interpretation of results. First, 
the Erber et al. study did not include an actual interaction, but merely presented 
participants with the anticipation of an interaction. Second, the anticipated 
interaction in the Erber et al. study was a task in which the participants would 
have to work with another person, not get another person to like them. It could 
be argued that the attempt to neutralise positive mood by these participants 
was in preparation for the anticipated task rather than the anticipated social 
interaction. 
Implementing these ingratiation strategies effectively (achieving the goal of 
being liked) is dependent on a number of factors, including cultural and 
situational constraints, knowledge (implicit or explicit) of the relationship 
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between nonverbal behaviors and internal states, the range of expressive cues 
that a person can command (which will depend to some extent on maturational 
status), personal style, and motivational constraints (DePaulo, 1992). Obviously, 
there are factors related to the target that will also influence the success or 
failure of ingratiation strategies. The sensitivity of the target to these 
ingratiation behaviors must play a part in the success or failure of the 
ingratiation strategy. This sensitivity will depend on a number of factors 
including the degree of autistic conspiracy (described above), motivation, 
knowledge of the relationship between nonverbal behaviors and internal states, 
and personality factors. For example, a person who is hypervigilant for signs 
that others are rejecting them will selectively attend to those cues that will 
confirm their fear. It appears, then, that the transparency of ingratiation 
strategies depends on factors pertaining to both the ingratiator and the target. 
Whatever the target's particular sensitivities, he or she must believe that the 
actor is behaving in that positive way because they genuinely feel that way -
not because they want something from the target (e.g., approval or liking). If 
the target suspects that the actor's positivity is an ingratiation strategy, the 
actor's motives are likely to be questioned, and liking decreases. On the basis of 
research summarised by Jones and Wortman (1973), one possible cue to 
ingratiation is the expression of a positive emotion that is judged to be excessive 
given the particular situation. For example, Godfrey et al (1986) found that 
unsuccessful ingratiators either suffered from the overemployment of obvious 
tactics like blatant flattery, or were awkward or tentative in their attempts to 
ingratiate themselves, making their ingratiation attempts transparent. These 
findings suggest that it is important for the target to believe that the 
ingratiators' motive is to present themselves honestly, not to disguise what they 
really feel in an attempt to fool the target. 
1.1.3 The relationship between experienced and expressed emotion in ingratiation 
One factor that may contribute to the transparency of ingratiation is a 
discrepancy between the emotion one is expressing, and the emotion one is 
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feeling. Wegner and Erber (1993) cited evidence from James (1890), Klinger 
(1982) and Vallacher (1993) to support their assertion that people do try to 
achieve behavior-compatible states of mind in social settings in order to make 
the task easier and to be convincing. They asserted that people anticipate cross-
fertilisation between covert processes of thought, emotion, and motivation on 
the one hand, and overt processes of talk, non-verbal expression and action on 
the other. Social strategies that involve any sort of deception will entail 
manipulating one's mental states so as to remain at least superficially consistent 
with the intended message. The authors referred to Stanislavski's (1965) 
"method" acting, and suggested that people do what they can to experience the 
inner states from which social behavior seems to radiate. The great acting 
teacher and director recommended that, in order to be convincing in a role, the 
actor must live the part by actually experiencing feelings that are analogous to 
the role. He exhorted his students to evoke emotional experiences within 
themselves in order to make their emotional portrayals authentic. Jones (1990) 
claimed that, if one wants to flatter another person, it is necessary to convince 
oneself that the person at least falls within the general range of those to whom 
such flattery is due. In like manner, Wegner and Erber (1993) claimed that some 
inward experience of what people do is necessary to make their self-
presentations effective, and they quoted Carnegie's (1936) memorable advice on 
how to win friends and influence people - become genuinely interested in other 
people. Damasio (1994) suggested that, in order to produce a convincing 
positive emotional expression (for example, smiling in front of a camera), it is 
necessary to experience positive emotion; the author recommended asking 
someone to tell a good joke or else learning how to employ the technique taught 
by Stanislavski. 
Experimental evidence for the use of this technique in everyday social 
interactions is sparse. In trying to account for the lack of empirical work in this 
domain, Jones (1990) suggested that, while there is a tendency for people to 
acknowledge that others are engaged in ingratiation strategies, they are 
reluctant to admit that they engage in such strategies themselves. He claimed 
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that researchers are not likely to gain much insight into ingratiation strategies 
by asking people about their own strategies because of this reluctance to admit 
to the use of them, and because, most of the time, these strategies are employed 
in a nonconscious way. Schlenker and Weigold (1992) acknowledged that 
ingratiating overtures are rarely the result of conscious or deliberate tactical 
planning, and evidence for relatively automatic, nonreflective and habitual 
impression management comes from Cheek and Hogan (1983), Jones (1990), 
and Paulhus (1988). This relative automaticity would make it difficult for 
people to articulate the strategies by which they ingratiate themselves to others. 
However, there is some experimental evidence to support the notion that 
people deliberately try to get into moods that will facilitate their social 
interactions by making their moods congruent with the task at hand. This 
applies to various social tasks; for example, Wegner and Erber (1992) provided 
evidence that people try to attenuate both positive and negative moods in 
certain social situations as follows: O'Neal and Taylor (1989) angered 
participants and then told one half that they would have a chance to retaliate 
and the other half that they would not have that chance. Those people who 
were preparing to retaliate preferred to watch aggressive videos and those who 
were not going to retaliate preferred to watch humorous videos. The authors 
inferred from these choices that those who were going to retaliate chose to 
watch aggressive videos in an attempt to foster or maintain the feelings 
necessary to get even. Conversely, those with no chance for retaliation were 
thought to have chosen humorous videos in an attempt to rid themselves of the 
hostile feelings for which they had no use; Tesser, Rosen and Waranch (1973) 
found that the mood of participants who had to transmit bad news became 
more unpleasant as the interaction approached, while the mood of participants 
who had to transmit good news became more pleasant. These authors 
concluded that people attempt to generate an emotional state congruent with 
the message they have to convey. 
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In addition to laboratory studies, there has been some fieldwork carried out 
in this area, which has increased the ecological validity of claims about the 
congruency of emotional experience and expression in ingratiation tasks. For 
example, Hochschild (1983) conducted extensive research into the recruitment, 
trainin~ and practices of flight attendants with two major airlines in the United 
States. She also conducted extensive, open-ended interviews with these flight 
attendants and observed them at work in his attempt to investigate the self-
management of emotion when people are attempting to ingratiate themselves 
with strangers. Airline attendants try to present themselves as warm and 
positive, irrespective of their personal emotional experience. Hochschild found 
that, as one strategy for evoking that warmth when dealing with passengers, 
attendants were encouraged to think of the passenger as a personal guest at 
home and treat the passenger as such. By the same token, the injunction to act 
as if the cabin were home obscures crucial differences between home and an 
airplane cabin: home is safe, home does not crash. It is the flight attendants' 
task to convey a sense of relaxed, homey cosiness, and when these staff 
members conjured up the experience of warmth and safety at home, the 
passengers responded positively to them, trusting that they were portraying 
their genuine feelings. Relatedly, Parkinson (1991) found that hairdressers learn 
to manufacture positive emotion that makes their positive interactions with 
their clients more effective. Trainee hairdressers reported that they "put on an 
act" to make their clients like them, while more experienced hairdressers 
reported that they had learned how to feel positive in order to make their 
positive overtures to their clients more effective. In this way, the experience of 
an emotion by the ingratiator makes the target believe that the ingratiator is 
sincere in his or her emotional expression. While it may be argued that 
experiencing an emotional state congruent with the emotion being expressed is 
necessarily sincere, it is the motivation behind the behavior that makes it 
ingratiatin~ not an incongruence between experienced and expressed emotion. 
When a person is trying to get someone else to like them, incongruence between 
the expressed and experienced emotions can serve as a cue to the motivation 
behind the actions. So, the evidence from these studies suggests that, in order to 
appear genuine in one's attempts to be positive towards others, one ideally 
would like to attain a state of thought, emotion or desire that is entirely 
compatible with what one must do in the social setting. 
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Studies in various other sub-disciplines of psychology have investigated the 
effects of mood on task performance, and their results suggest that successful 
task performance is dependent, to some extent, on congruent emotional 
experience. Kavanagh and Hausfield (1986), in an experiment with 
undergraduate athletes, showed that experimenter-induced positive mood 
improved physical performance and experimenter-induced sadness decreased 
physical performance. Relatedly, Kerr and Cox (1991) found that successful 
squash players were able to self-induce positive mood and minimise negative 
feelings, whereas unsuccessful players were not able to regulate their emotions 
as effectively. In assessing the effects of mood on cognitive tasks, Mayer and 
Bremer (1985) showed that performance on some cognitive and psychomotor 
tasks was positively correlated with positive mood, but Hesse and Spies (1996) 
showed that the induction of negative (sad) mood increased performance on a 
lexical priming task when compared with positive mood induction. Hesse and 
Spies proposed that this was due to the systematic, analytic and detail-oriented 
information-processing strategy that typically accompanies sadness. Thus, 
while positive mood enhances some cognitive tasks, negative mood may 
enhance others. For example, creative and inductive reasoning may be 
improved by happy moods (Isen, Daubman & Nowicki, 1987; Isen, Johnson, 
Mertz & Robinson, 1985). In the clinical domain, Raps, Reinhard and Seligman 
(1980) found that depressed patients showed deficits in cognitive task 
performance, but that these deficits were reversed by positive mood induction. 
Depressed mood decreased performance, while positive mood increased 
performance. The evidence from these studies points to mood congruency 
effects in which particular mood states facilitate performance on particular 
tasks. Therefore it is not only in the performance of ingratiation tasks that mood 
plays a facilitating role. For ingratiators, when expressed positive emotion is 
congruent with experienced emotion, their performance may well be improved. 
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While it may be desirable to present positive emotion to others in some 
social situations, Parrott (1993) noted that it is likely to be more difficult to 
present a mood to others that one does not feel, than to present a mood that one 
does feel. He pointed out further that it is more socially dangerous to present a 
mood that one does feel because one's true mood or feeling may "leak out" in 
ways that others can detect. Similarly, research reviewed by Fiske and Taylor 
(1991) showed that when a false impression is being conveyed, frequently the 
nonverbal communication channel will "leak", giving away the speaker's true 
feelings. Sometimes, such leakage does not go unnoticed by a target, and 
attempts to make a positive impression can be undermined. Ekman, Friesen 
and O'Sullivan (1988) found that an attempt to display one emotion while 
feeling another leads to signs of this internal struggle appearing on the face and 
the strategy is revealed. 
As an explanation of emotion leakage, Greene, O'Hair, Cody and Yen (1985) 
suggested that emotional states are characterised by autonomic and motor 
responses produced at low levels of the output representation, and that these 
reactions proceed automatically. It is not necessary to construct a smile when 
one is happy or to remember to clench one's teeth when one is angry. As a 
result of the automaticity of these low-level components of emotional 
responses, there is a tendency toward leakage during deception. In their 
experiment in which some participants were instructed to lie about a particular 
aspect of their lives, Greene et al. (1985) showed that deceivers made 
significantly less body movements than truth-tellers, and exhibited more 
smiling than truth-tellers, and that these differences were perceived by raters 
who were blind to the truth-teller/ deceiver conditions. DePaulo (1992) pointed 
to the connection between emotion and non-verbal behavior posited by such 
major theorists of emotion as Buck (1984), Ekman (1977), and Izard (1977). 
These researchers maintain that there are hard-wired links between the 
elicitation of certain basic emotions and the triggering of facial muscles that 
produce expressions of those emotions. These hard-wired links make the 
experience of an emotion almost sure to trigger the facial expression of the 
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emotion, unless there is concerted effort to control those facial muscles. It is for 
this reason that DePaulo (1992) asserted that the kind of information that is 
conveyed by non-verbal behavior is sometimes more intensely and inescapably 
personal than is the information conveyed by verbal behavior. 
However, the very mechanisms that lead to emotional leakage allow people 
to successfully pose certain states nonverbally. Virtually every study of the 
deliberate presentation of an emotional state (for example, fear) has shown that 
people can successfully convey to others, using only nonverbal cues, the 
impression that they are experiencing a particular internal state when in fact 
they are not (DePaulo, 1992). By activating the hard-wired structures proposed 
by Buck (1984), people can tap into the spontaneous expressions of those 
emotions. If people are so successful at deceiving others about their internal 
states, how does the problem with emotion leakage come about? The answer 
seems to be in the degree of deception being attempted. As discussed earlier, 
ingratiation strategies tend to involve such features as selective disclosures and 
omissions, matters of emphasis and toning, and editing of self-images rather 
than out-and-out deception. Lippa (1976) reported that when people tried to 
assume an entire constellation of behaviors indicative of a wholly different 
personality type than their own, the deception was perceived by observers. It 
may be that, while people are trying to express an emotion that is fairly close to 
their experienced state, they are more credible than when they try to express an 
emotion that is very different from their experienced state. It follows, then, that 
ensuring that one's experienced emotion is close to the emotion one is trying to 
express is an effective way to be credible. 
1.1.4 The perception of successful ingratiation 
The monitoring of ingratiation strategies entails that people make 
inferences about the effects of their attempts at impression management. It may 
be that actors observe their own behavior and infer from that how others might 
be reacting (Bern, 1964). Actors may observe their own behavior, form a 
judgement of that behavior and, by assuming that others think the same way 
that they do, infer the targets' reactions. 
18 
In the absence of any dear reason to think otherwise, people seem to believe 
that others see them quite similarly to how they see themselves (DePaulo, 
Kenny, Hoover, Webb & Oliver, 1987; Kenny & DePaulo, 1993). Kenny (1994) 
found that individuals assume that their personalities are immediately 
transparent to others. This assumption allows actors to assume that they appear 
to others the same way that they appear to themselves. While Kenny's work 
applied to judgements about personality, it can usefully be applied to 
inferences made about emotional states. He concluded that people directly 
observe their own behavior, and infer from it what other people think of them. 
He claimed that peoples' theories about themselves produce expectations of 
how others perceive them and therefore drive their meta-perceptions about 
how others see them. The possibility that people's theories about themselves are 
not accurate accounts for the inaccuracies in their beliefs about how others 
perceive them. Kenny cited, as evidence, the particularly strong relationships 
between the way people view themselves and the way they believe that others 
view them; his review of six studies produced a very strong positive 
relationship between the perceiver's self-perception and the perceiver's beliefs 
of others' perceptions of him or her. In a review of eight studies measuring 
generalised and dyadic accuracy (that is, how others in general view the actor, 
and how one other person views the actor), Kenny (1994) found that the overall 
level of generalised accuracy for personality traits was substantial, while the 
overall level of dyadic accuracy was much lower. Accuracy is concerned with 
the questions of whether people can predict how others describe themselves, 
and alternatively, whether people can predict how others describe them. 
Accuracy refers to the degree of matching between a prediction and an actual 
description. So it seems that, although people have a reasonably accurate 
impression of how others generally perceive them, they are not as accurate 
when it comes to judging how specific individuals perceive them. 
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Alternatively, people may see themselves as others see them (Shrauger & 
Schoeneman, 1979). According to this view, people watch their interaction 
partners, and perceive themselves in terms of the partner's reactions to them. 
Funder (1995) proposed a model of how people make judgements about others' 
personalities (interpersonal perception). While Funder's model was developed 
for the purposes of explaining personality judgements, it can usefully be 
applied to the current topic of judgements of emotion. Similarly, while the 
model was designed to explain perception Oudgements of another's 
personality) it can be applied to meta perception Qudgements of another's 
perceptions of the self). The terms used by Funder need to be made explicit here 
in order to prevent confusion with the terms commonly used in the ingratiation 
literature. Funder referred to a judge and a target ( of the judgement). The 
ingratiation literature refers to a target as the person towards whom an 
ingratiation strategy is aimed. During an ingratiation task, both the ingratiator 
and the target of that ingratiation strategy fulfil the roles of what Funder calls 
"judge" and "target". Additionally, in a dyadic interaction, both participants 
can make judgements and meta-judgements, but the processes involved in both 
kinds of judgement remain the same. Funder's Realistic Accuracy Model (RAM) 
proposes that judgement accuracy Oudgements of others' attributes or 
metaperceptions of others' perceptions of the self) depends on four factors, 
namely, the availability, detection and utilisation of relevant behavioral cues. 
Accurate, informative cues to emotion will result in accurate judgements. 
Availability involves the presence of cues to emotional states. Detection is the 
sensitivity of a judge to available cues and utilisation involves the way in which 
a judge will interpret the cues that have been perceived. Relevance is the 
congruence between behavioral cues and personality traits (or emotional states) 
in the target. 
As might be evident, Funder's RAM incorporates some of the variables 
investigated in the present research. For example, relevance is the congruence 
of emotional experience and expression, and availability is the expressiveness 
{referred to above), both of which reside in the target. In the present research 
20 
this applies to the ingratiator while being judged by the target, and equally to 
the target of the ingratiation while the ingratiator is making meta-perceptions of 
how much the target likes them. Detection and utilisation comprise the 
intrapersonal factors of the judge (in the present research, this role is taken by 
the ingratiator while making meta-perceptions of how much the target of the 
ingratiation likes them, and by the target of the ingratiation when making 
judgements about the ingratiator). Relevance, availability, detection and 
utilisation may be involved in both tasks, perception and meta-perception, and 
are factors that apply to both the ingratiator and the target of the ingratiation at 
different times during the interaction. 
Kenny's (1994) theory (by assuming that others perceive them the same 
way that they do, actors may develop beliefs about how others view them 
based on their self-theories and self-perceptions) can be integrated into 
Funder's RAM. If people do not look to the behaviors of others for cues about 
the others' perceptions of them, the factors of relevance and availability could 
still apply. If the emotional cues that ingratiators perceive in themselves are not 
relevant to what they are expressing, or are of very low intensity, the meta-
perceptions they have of the target's liking of them will be different than when 
relevance and availability are higher. 
The explanatory breadth of Funder's theory encompasses more of the 
specific phenomena under investigation in the present research, and therefore 
an integration of Kenny's and Funder's theories was employed for the present 
study. 
1.1.5 Summary 
The empirical evidence and theoretical claims presented thus far point to 
some plausible hypotheses that warrant further investigation. First, people who 
express positivity are more likable than those who do not. This is a function of 
both expressiveness and positivity, and may, or may not, be dependent on the 
experience of positive emotion. Second, the expression of positivity as an 
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ingratiation strategy is more effective when the target is convinced that this 
display is an authentic representation of the actor's emotional state. By noticing 
behavioral cues, the target makes inferences about the internal emotional state 
of the actor. If those cues are suggestive of an emotional state that is 
incongruent with the particular emotion displayed, the target may question the 
motives of the actor for the display of that emotion. Third, people may self-
regulate their emotions in order to make their emotional expressions congruent 
with their emotional experience. As a consequence, any emotional cues noticed 
by the target are more likely to be congruent with the emotion being expressed 
and felt. Fourth, actors' meta-perceptions of how they are presenting 
themselves depends on the cues from the target of their self-presentational 
strategies, and on the perceptions of the actors' internal cognitive and affective 
cues as well as their behavior. Fifth, interpersonal perception and meta-
perception both involve four factors, namely relevance, availability, detection, 
and utilisation. 
1.2 Part two: The self-regulation of emotion in adolescence 
The self-regulation of emotion is a domain of psychology that has received 
much attention in recent times, initially in the developmental literature (e.g., 
Campos, Campos & Barrett, 1989; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1992; Thompson, 1990, 
1994), and more recently in the adult literature (e.g. Gross & Levenson, 1993; 
Izard, 1990). In the clinical literature, emotion dysregulation is highlighted as a 
major factor in the interpersonal difficulties experienced by those who have 
psychiatric problems. Therapies for psychological disorders that have a high 
impact on interpersonal functioning inevitably contain some element of 
emotion regulation strategy. For example, breathing retraining and relaxation 
for social phobia (Andreoli, Casolari & Rigatelli, 1995), and emotion regulation 
skills for borderline personality disorder (Linehan & Kehrer, 1993). In the 
forensic literature, the inability to self-regulate emotion is cited widely as a 
major causative factor in criminal offending, particularly when that 
dysregulation is evident in social functioning (Ward, Keenan & Hudson, in 
press). 
1.2.1 The development of the self-regulation of emotion 
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Although it is reasonable to suggest that people should self-regulate their 
emotional experiences in order to make them congruent with the emotions they 
want to express, the ability to do so depends on many factors. According to 
Thompson (1994), emotion regulation is defined as" ... the extrinsic and intrinsic 
processes responsible for monitoring, evaluating and modifying emotional 
reactions, especially their intensive and temporal features, to accomplish one's 
goals" (pp. 27-28). For example, as has been suggested, when trying to 
ingratiate oneself with another person it may be necessary to manage negative 
emotions, such as anxiety, in order to prevent the leakage of that emotion while 
one is attempting to portray positivity. Many researchers are actively involved 
in identifying the various factors (for example, age, maturational state, 
experience, culture, language and psychopathology) which impact on these 
questions: whether it is possible to self-regulate emotion, how the ability to do 
so develops across the lifespan and how effective this self-regulation is (Dodge 
& Garber, 1991). For example, Labouvie-Vief, Hakim-Larson, De Voe and 
Schoeberlein (1989) found, in a study of emotional development (participants 
were aged 11- 67 years), that there was a developmental trend in the 
understanding and control of emotional states as a function of age. As people 
got older, they understood their own and others' emotional states better, and 
they were able to control their own emotional states more effectively. 
The self-regulation of emotion depends on biological maturity, genetic 
predisposition (particularly temperament), interactions between the individual 
and the environment, and cognitive development (Thompson, 1991). Each of 
these factors contributes to individuals' ability to self-regulate their emotional 
experience and expression. This ability must impact directly on the use of self-
regulatory strategies in social situations, including the modulation of emotional 
experience and expression, which are called for by ingratiation tasks. Evidence 
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for the relevance of emotion regulation to social functioning comes from a 
number of quarters. Baumeister and Heatherton (1996), in presenting a 
cognitive model of self-regulation, suggested that self-regulatory failure is a 
major contributing factor in interpersonal problems. In the developmental 
literature, Rubin, Coplan, Fox and Calkins (1995) showed children with good 
emotion regulation to have fewer social problems than those with poor emotion 
regulation. The relevance of self-regulation to interpersonal relations is 
evidenced by the large numbers of studies concerned with emotion regulation 
and social relations in pre-school children that have shown how emotional 
skills, including self-regulation, play a critical role in prosocial behavior 
(Cassidy, Parke, Butkovsky & Braungart, 1992; Denham, McKinley, Couchard & 
Holt, 1990; Garner, Jones & Palmer, 1994; Walden & Field, 1990). Eisenberg, 
Fabes, Murphy, Maszk, Smith and Karbon (1995) and Eisenberg, Fabes, Karbon, 
Murphy, Wosinski, Polazzi, Carlo and Juhnke (1996) found that children who 
were both unregulated and high in emotional intensity were prone to social 
problems. Studies of children's empathic responding have shown that those 
who are good self-regulators show more empathy than those who are poor self-
regulators do (Eisenberg, Fabes, Murphy et al., 1996). These authors have all 
concluded that emotionality and emotion regulation contribute to the 
development of social functioning. Similarly, Parke (1994) suggested that 
emotional skills have become recognised as a centrepiece for understanding 
children's emerging competence in their social relationships. 
As stated above, Thompson (1991) pinpointed four factors contributing to 
the ability to self-regulate emotion. The first was biological maturity. 
Segalowitz & Rose-Krasnor (1992) have suggested that development of the 
frontal lobes of the brain plays an important part in cognitive and social 
development, in that the development of executive functions (for example, 
development of strategies; evaluation of strategies; monitoring, inhibition and 
initiation of behavior; monitoring of the effects of behavior on others) " ... are 
recognised as critical for competent social behavior" (p.3). Without these 
executive abilities, the planning of social strategies (for example, ingratiation), 
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the regulation of emotional states, the monitoring of their progress and the 
evaluation of their outcomes are compromised. These observations come from 
studies conducted with people who have had diseases of, or traumatic brain 
damage to, the frontal lobes of the brain (Stuss & Gow, 1992a, 1992b). Stuss 
(1992) and Chelune and Thompson (1987) have found that development of the 
frontal lobes is largely complete by puberty, with some further development 
during adolescence. Further, Case (1992) maintained that between the ages of 11 
and 16-18, an additional cycle of frontal lobe development may take place that 
would account for the psychological cycle of development that occurs during 
that time period. 
The second factor was temperament. Temperament has been 
conceptualised as variations in behavioral style that are presumed to have a 
constitutional and/or hereditary basis (Thompson, 1991). Most theories of 
temperament underscore individual differences in emotional reactivity and 
regulatory features (e.g., Derryberry & Rothbart, 1988; Rothba.i-t, Derryberry & 
Posner, 1994). Kagan's well known work on behavioral inhibition (Kagan, 
Reznick & Snidman, 1987) suggests that humans are genetically endowed with 
individual differences in the threshold of response in those parts of the central 
nervous system that contribute to states of psychological uncertainty and 
physiological arousal. Kagan et al. (1987) showed that those children identified 
as being behaviorally inhibited behaved in a shy, cautious manner, whereas 
those who were identified as being uninhibited behaved in a fearless and 
outgoing way. A popular experimental methodology for investigating this 
phenomenon is to confront a child with a stranger (either a peer or an adult) 
and monitor behavioral and physiological responses to this encounter. The 
unfamiliarity of this encounter produces differential physiological and 
behavioral responses among children. Connell and Thompson (1986) also 
suggested that emotionality demonstrated in a Strange Situation experiment 
has significant consequences for subsequent social interactions. Similarly, 
Eisenberg, Fabes, Minore, Mathy, Hanish and Brown (1994) referred to a 
number of studies that have shown that children's temperament, particularly 
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their emotionality, is associated with socially competent behavior. Emotional 
arousability, negative affect and temperamental intensity have been associated 
with angry outbursts, aggression, acting out behaviors and low popularity. 
However, it would be a mistake to assume that temperament is 
unmalleable, or that the environment cannot influence the behavioral 
manifestations of a particular temperamental style. For example, Reznick, 
Kagan, Snidman, Gersten, Baak and Rosenberg (1986) found that some children 
who were classified as behaviorally inhibited at twenty-one months were re-
classified as uninhibited at five and a half years, showing that they had learned 
to control their fear responses. This is not to imply that they still felt as fearful 
as they had when they were twenty-one months old and were simply 
suppressing that fear. Emotion regulation involves cognitive aspects such as, in 
this case, the knowledge that one is unlikely to come to harm when in the 
Strange Situation. The development of emotion regulation skills, likely learned 
in the context of sensitive and responsive parenting (Kopp, 1989), allowed 
social interaction with strangers in five and a half year old children who had 
been incapable of such interaction at twenty-one months. Thus, while 
temperamental tendencies towards inhibition or disinhibition may be 
moderated by environmental contingencies and cognitive development, they 
impact on social functioning from the beginning of social life, and make 
emotion regulation a critical part of that functioning. 
The third factor, the capacity to self-regulate their emotions, is importantly 
a function of children's interactions with others. Through contact with multiple 
sources of socialisation (family, teachers, peers) children learn which emotions 
they may safely feel and/ or express (Campos & Stenberg, 1981: Harris, 1989; 
Malatesta-Magai, 1991; Miller & Sperry, 1987). If children see others 
successfully managing their emotional expressions, they learn that emotion 
regulation is possible (Campos, Barrett, Lamb, Goldsmith & Stenberg, 1983; 
Walden, 1991). With the developmentofmusculoskeletalcontrol, and with the 
advent of language, children become more adept at emotion regulation. 
Increasingly complex language skills allow children to communicate with 
others about their own and others' emotional states and thereby obtain direct 
instruction about emotion regulation. They are able to approach, withdraw 
from, or alter emotionally salient features of the environment, and gain 
increasing autonomy in emotion self-regulation (Gross & Munoz, 1995). 
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During social interaction experiences, children also learn to differentially 
express positive and negative emotions (Malatesta & Izard, 1984; Saarni & von 
Salisch, 1993) and learn display rules that govern the expression of emotions in 
specific situations (Ekman, 1972; Malatesta, Culver, Tesman & Shepard, 1989; 
Saarni, 1990). Display rules are the set of beliefs about what expressions of 
emotions are socially desirable or appropriate (Saarni & von Salisch, 1993). 
Adults have a sense of the social display rules governing which emotions ought 
to be displayed or not displayed in given situations. For example, they know 
that it is inappropriate to be jocular at a funeral wake, but appropriate to be 
jocular at a birthday party. Over time, children are increasingly exposed to, and 
pick up on, the display rules of their culture (Saarni & von Salisch, 1993). 
Ekman and Friesen (1975) introduced four prototypical strategies for 
characterising how people in Western cultures might modify their emotional 
behavior when they attempt to put display rules into practice. These strategies 
are minimisation, maximisation, masking and substitution. The first three 
strategies are involved in the subtle changes that people make to their 
presentational selves. As postulated by Jones and Pittman (1982), selective 
disclosures and omissions, and matters of emphasis and toning are the typical 
features of ingratiation behaviors, and minimisation, maximisation, and 
masking will be the emotion regulation strategies employed during 
ingratiation. 
The fourth factor, the development of cognitive skills, impacts on the 
development of emotion regulation skills. Since current literatures show that 
cognition and emotion are powerfully interrelated (Case, 1985; Dodge, 1991; 
Izard, 1992, 1993; Parrott & Schulkin, 1993), it follows that the development of 
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emotion and cognition are similarly intertwined. For example, Wintre & 
Vallance (1994) reported on a study that demonstrated the development of 
children's differentiation and integration of emotional experience and cognition 
in a stage-like fashion. Similarly, Kopp (1989) maintained that planful emotion 
regulation emerges slowly because it is intrinsically tied to a developmental 
relationship with cognition and is thus constrained, to some extent, by the 
timetable of cognitive development. Consequently, certain cognitive processing 
skills, for example the executive functions, have to become functionally mature 
within the behavioral/ emotional repertoire before they can be mobilised for 
emotion regulation. 
By middle childhood children are already aware that emotional expression 
can be dissociated from internal emotional experience (Harris & Gross, 1989; 
Saarni, 1984; Taylor & Harris, 1984). The ability to do this requires the ability to 
distinguish between the appearance of an emotion and the reality of an 
emotion; that is, to understand that emotions are in part internal, mental states, 
and not just external appearances (Banerjee, 1997). An awareness of these more 
mentalistic and goal-related aspects of emotion play a central role in mature 
emotional functioning (Campos, Mumme, Kermoian & Campos, 1994). In 
learning to operate adaptively in their social worlds, children must also learn to 
contextualise this more abstract knowledge about the distinction between 
internal feelings and external appearances when using display rules for 
emotional expression that are relevant to their culture. Adults are aware that 
inner feelings and outer expressions can be distinct, recognising that people 
can, and often do, hide their internal emotions by altering their external 
expressions (Zammuner & Frijda, 1994), or that others' expressions may be a 
mask for their true feelings (Hochschild, 1983). These expressive strategies have 
also been observed in preschool children (Saarni, 1990; Banerjee, 1997). Saarni 
and von Salisch (1993), and Harris (1989) found that children younger than six 
could, when asked to, readily adopt pretend facial expressions, but they could 
not articulate the embedded relationships involved in deliberate emotional 
dissemblance. By the age of six, however, children readily grasp that emotional 
28 
dissemblance has as its basic function the creation of a false impression on 
others. The ability to express an emotion that is at odds with experienced 
emotion has been demonstrated to be a function of increasing age by Feldman, 
Jenkins and Popoola (1979). In their drink-tasting experiment, participants 
sampled sweetened and unsweetened drinks while trying to convince another 
person that they liked both drinks. As participants' age increased from 6 years 
to 20 years, the ability to convince others improved systematically. Clearly, 
cognitive developmental changes have a dramatic impact on the development 
of emotion and self-regulation. 
The repertoire of strategies for emotional self-regulation expands 
significantly in size and complexity during middle childhood (Thompson, 
1991). During this period, for example, children come to understand that 
emotional experience can be altered by internal emotional re-direction (thinking 
happy thoughts in a sad situation), or by acting in a way that provokes a 
different emotion (for example, playing with toys when feeling anxious) 
(Altshuler & Ruble, 1989; Band & Weicz, 1988; Carroll & Steward, 1984; Harris, 
Olthof, Terwogt, 1981). Saarni (1988) reported that these more sophisticated 
understandings develop in the context of social interactions, and may be 
scaffolded by adults and older children. 
From the literature reviewed above, it may be concluded that, by early 
adolescence, children have the emotion regulation skills necessary for the 
deliberate expression of emotion that may not be congruent with their 
emotional experience at the time. They have the biological maturity, the social 
experience and the cognitive skills necessary to know what emotional 
expressions are appropriate for specific social tasks, and to strategically regulate 
their emotional experiences and expressions. 
1.2.2 The self-regulation of emotion and sodal functioning in adolescence 
The literature on the further development of emotional self-regulation 
during adolescence is sparse, the assumption being that this developmental 
period is the beginning of the adult years (Thompson, 1991) and therefore the 
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literature on adolescent emotional development tends to be subsumed under 
the adult literature. For example, Greene (1990) found, in a factor analytic 
investigation of adolescent emotion (ages 9 -15), that there were two internally 
consistent factors that were virtually identical to the positive and negative 
emotion dimensions described in the literature on adult emotion. However, this 
author also found that variation along these dimensions was related to the 
social transitions that are part of adolescence (for example, the transition from 
same-sex relationships to heterosexual relationships). Further evidence for 
major developmental challenges during adolescence comes from Petersen and 
Hamburg (1986) and Nottelman (1987), who found that entry into secondary 
school represented significant change from elementary school, and posed major 
socioemotional challenges for adolescents, challenges that would certainly 
differentiate adolescent emotional development from adults to some extent. 
While adolescent emotion appears to be consistent with adult emotion, 
there may be some unique and specific developmental issues that influence 
emotional experience and the ability to self-regulate emotion during 
adolescence. In particular, the regulation of emotion for the purpose of 
achieving social goals is of vital importance during adolescence. Researchers are 
becoming increasingly aware that poor relationships in adolescence are 
predictive of social incompetence and maladjustment in adulthood (Cassidy & 
Lynn, 1991; Cole, Chan & Lytton, 1989; Feehan, McGee,Williams, & Nada-Raja, 
1995; Rotheram-Borus, 1989; Schonert & Kimberly, 1993). Therefore, increasing 
attention is being paid to the complexity of what is involved in poor 
relationships in adolescence, and to the role of self-regulation of emotion as a 
critical factor in successful relationships (Buchsbaum, Toth, Clyman, & 
Cicchetti, 1992; Kobak & Ferenz-Gillies, 1995; Kobak, Ferenz-Gillies, Everhart & 
Seabrook, 1994). 
While biological, temperamental and social development are relatively 
advanced by early adolescence, a number of developmental factors arise during 
the adolescent years that contribute to emotion regulation and social 
competence. Four of these factors will be addressed here, in an attempt to 
30 
identify some that might differentiate early adolescence from late adolescence, 
namely, identity development, perspective-taking and egocentrism, coping 
strategies and cognitive development. 
Erikson (1983) has described the task of identity formation as a critical factor 
in the development of intimate relationships. Identity formation is the process 
whereby adolescents begin to explore the possible identities available to them 
in an attempt to individuate from their parents and prepare for an independent 
life. Moore and Boldero (1991) found that adolescents (aged 12 - 20 years) who 
scored highly on a measure of identity formation were more satisfied with their 
relationships than those who scored lower on the measure. In addition, the 
high-scorers' relationships appeared affectively richer. Similarly, Kacerguis and 
Adams (1980) found that, among college students, more advanced stages of 
identity development were associated with higher levels of intimacy formation. 
Identity development is also related to decreased self-consciousness, in that 
those who have achieved an identity are more willing to reveal the self to others 
(Adams, Abraham & Markstrom, 1987). Additionally, identity development is 
related to increased self-confidence (Helbing, 1984). 
Colvin (1993) found, in a longitudinal study of participants from the age of 
3 to 23, that the judgability of adolescents was positively related to ego 
resilience (the psychological adjustment that is associated with identity 
formation). Judgability is characterised by the ease with which coherent 
patterns of personality and behavior in others are detected, and judgable people 
are characterised as open, knowable and coherent, whereas less judgable 
individuals might be perceived as closed, enigmatic, rigid or erratic. 
Psychological adjustment includes such facets of personality as correspondence 
between the private and public self, behavioral predictability, self-knowledge 
and social skill (Colvin, 1993). Colvin's findings further stress the link between 
the development of identity and emotional expression (via judgability). This 
evidence suggests that the development of a personal identity (a task usually 
begun in adolescence) impacts strongly on interpersonal functioning. As 
identity develops, so does the ability to self-regulate emotion in social 
situations. 
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The development of interpersonal understanding during adolescence 
includes two topics that have been of particular interest to researchers. These 
are perspective~taking (Barenboim, 1981: Selman, 1980), and adolescent egocentrism 
(Elkind, 1967; Lapsley, Milstead, Quintana, Flannery, & Buss, 1986). Selman 
(1980) has proposed a model of perspective-taking that emerges during 
adolescence rather than the changes typically described in childhood. Selman' s 
levels begin with simple egocentric judgements (the self's own viewpoint is the 
same as the other's viewpoint); then there is a move to a self-reflective phase in 
which the individual recognises the self as a possible target of others' 
perspectives; following this, there emerges a mutual, or third-person, 
perspective, which is characterised by the ability to engage in recursive 
perspective-taking ("You know that I know that you know ... "); and lastly, a 
level is reached which involves the understanding of a network of perspectives 
which binds individuals into a social system. 
Elkind' s (1967) notion of egocentrism identifies the emerging recognition 
that one may be the focus of another's attention. In early adolescence, this leads 
to an overgeneralisation of this new understanding, and a self-consciousness 
that assumes that one's behaviors are the focus of others' thoughts. Egocentrism 
involves two concepts, "imaginary audience" and "personal fable". Imaginary 
audience refers to the tendency for adolescents to believe that they are the 
centre of attention, and that others are constantly watching them. Personal fable 
refers to the elaborate fantasies that adolescents construct in order to explain 
why everyone should be watching them. Together, imaginary audience and 
personal fable result in the fantasies which place adolescents at the desired, and 
dreaded, centre of attention. Jahnke and Blanchard-Fields (1993) found, as did 
Lapsley and Murphy (1985), that egocentrism is the outcome of social cognitive 
development, and that personal fable and imaginary audience are not negative, 
but adaptive, and aid in the process of resolving the conflict between being 
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dependant on one's parents and the need for autonomy. These authors 
proposed that self-reflection and reciprocal perspective-taking are facilitated by 
adolescent egocentrism. 
There is evidence to suggest that this egocentrism decreases as adolescence 
progresses (e.g., Anolik, 1981; Elkind & Bowen, 1979; Enright, Lapsley & 
Shukla, 1979; Goossens, Seiffge-Krenke & Marcoen, 1992; Simmons, Rosenberg 
& Rosenberg, 1973), and beliefs about others' perspectives of one become more 
realistic (e.g. Protinsky & Wilkerson, 1986). However, it has also been suggested 
that the phenomenon of the "imaginary audience" reappears whenever 
significant social transitions occur, such as the transition from elementary 
school to high school or the transition from high school to college ( e.g. Peterson 
& Roscoe, 1991). Enright and Deist (1979) emphasised the importance of the 
ability to see themselves as others see them as a critical factor in adolescents' 
identity formation. The ability to take others' perspectives and self-reflect both 
require emotional regulatory skills, since it is necessary to control one's own 
emotional experiences while attempting to take another's perspective. Equally, 
it is necessary to control one's emotional experiences when one is attempting to 
reflect on one's thoughts, feelings and behaviors since the interruption of 
cognitive activity by emotion is well established (e.g., Nielson & Sarason, 1981). 
Altshuler and Ruble (1989) suggested that with increasing age children 
have more access to their own thoughts and strategies, which may help them to 
expand their repertoire of situationally relevant coping strategies. For example, 
Brotman Brand (1990) showed developmental trends in the way youngsters 
cope with diabetes. The younger children (mean age 8.8 years) employed 
primary coping strategies (trying to modify aspects of the situation), directing 
their coping at concrete, modifiable aspects of diabetes control, for example, 
getting an injection. In contrast, the older group (mean age 14.6 years) reported 
significantly more secondary control (trying to come to terms with unalterable 
circumstances), for example, changing their thoughts and emotional reactions 
to diabetes. Similarly, Compas, Banez, Malcarne and Worsham (1991) 
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supported the belief that emotion-focused coping emerges during early 
adolescence, well after problem-focused coping skills. These authors suggested 
that (a) younger children may have less access to, or awareness of, their own 
internal emotional states, (b) younger children may fail to recognise that 
emotions can be brought under self-regulation, and (c) the emotion-focused 
coping efforts of others are less observable than problem-focused coping 
strategies, and therefore less easily learned through modelling processes. This 
evidence suggests that, as adolescence progresses, children have more coping 
strategies at their disposal, including learning to modify their emotions. An 
increasing awareness that emotions can be self-regulated, and practice at doing 
so over the adolescent years should make older adolescents more skilled at 
emotion regulation tha.n younger adolescents. 
Deeply embedded in adolescents' views of the self, of relationships to 
others, of society and of the world is their cognitive development . Basic 
psychodynamic and family issues of separation and individuation are 
evidenced during adolescence as well as the adolescent's increasing breadth of 
vision and decreasing sense of certainty. New and powerful emotions challenge 
the adolescent's emerging cognitive skills and rationality, but it is those same 
developing cognitive skills on which the adolescent must rely to make sense of 
unexpectedly complex feelings (Keating, 1990). In a series of experiments, 
Chandler, Boyes and Ball (1990) showed how relativistic thinking (coming to 
acknowledge that beliefs are not simply true or false, and that objective 
evidence may not exist as justification for all beliefs) develops through the ages 
of 12 years to 16 years. In their study, this sophisticated approach to knowledge 
and problems was associated with formal operational thinking ability, but not 
concrete operational thinking ability, and was also associated with a more 
mature identity status. Thus, the ability to regulate the unexpectedly complex 
emotions associated with adolescence may be dependent on the development of 
sophisticated cognitive skills. 
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Nissim-Sabat (1978) found, in a shtdy of 16-18 year olds, that there was a 
relationship between Piagetian cognitive stages and social orientation. Those 
children who were capable of formal operational thinking had more 
sophisticated social cognitive skills than those who were not capable of such 
thinking. Case (1985) proposed four substages of cognitive development during 
adolescence that replace the single Piagetian move from concrete operational 
thinking to formal operational thinking. Case detailed increasing levels of 
cognitive development throughout adolescence, levels that lead to more 
sophisticated strategies and levels of understanding. For Case, a thread running 
through this developmental period is the emergence of perspective taking, a 
decrease in egocentrism and the increasing use of hypothetical thought. As 
adolescence progresses, thinking tends to: involve abstract rather than merely 
concrete representation; become more multidimensional rather than limited to a 
single issue; become more relative rather than absolute in the conception of 
knowledge; become more self-reflective and self-aware (Keating, 1990). In her 
evaluation of available research, Neimark (1982) concluded that, regardless of 
investigators' theoretical orientation and method of assessment, there was a 
clear change in the quality and power of thought during the 11-15 year age 
range. 
In general, there is an increase in cognitive differentiation during 
adolescence. This cognitive differentiation involves the increasing ability to 
hold several complex mental representations simultaneously, and may be 
closely related to other key psychological developments, particularly in the self-
system and in relationships with significant others, both family and peers. That 
is, a broader process of separation and individuation, which requires a more 
advanced level of objectifying the self in relation to others, may be intimately 
connected to the more traditional cognitive changes noted above. This cognitive 
differentiation also results in more flexible thinking, and the ability to adapt to 
changing environments, choosing among a variety of possible responses rather 
than employing a single, generic strategy for all sihtations. If so, this would 
imply close connections between cognitive, social and emotional developments 
(Keating, 1990). This author notes that such mutual influences need to be 
explored further. 
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The evidence presented in the four areas above suggests that there are 
developmental changes during adolescence that impact on social functioning 
and emotion regulation. It seems that, as adolescence progresses, and with an 
increase in cognitive flexibility, children develop a sense of identity that 
impacts on how they interact with others. They also become more able to self-
reflect and see others' perspectives, and increase their range of emotional 
coping strategies. All of these developmental tasks are intimately linked to the 
self-regulation of emotion. 
1.2.3 Summa711 
As was the case for the studies of ingratiation, the theoretical and empirical 
claims in the developmental studies presented thus far also point to some 
plausible hypotheses. First, the development of the ability to self-regulate 
emotion in the service of social goals begins in infancy, and develops in 
complexity and effectiveness as a function of biological maturation, cognitive 
development, environmental challenges and socialisation, and learning 
processes. It has been observed that, by the end of middle childhood (9 years), 
children understand the interpersonal consequences of emotional display 
(Banerjee, 1997; Garner, 1996; Harris, 1989), for example, that one can influence 
others by the display of emotion. By elementary school years (10-11 years), 
children experience many social encounters in which they feel it is necessary to 
manage their feelings and expressive behavior (Saarni & von Salisch, 1993). In 
their interactions with others, there are times when they need to inhibit their 
emotional expression or enhance such expression. Using self-regulation 
strategies helps to regulate negative emotion, regulate the emotions of others, 
and present the self in a desired emotional way. Upon entering adolescence, 
children have developed the ability to distinguish real from apparent emotions 
(Harris, Donnelly, Guz & Pitt-Watson, 1986), to be aware of the situational (e.g. 
I'm happy when it's my birthday") and mental (e.g. "I mostly don't let other 
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kids know when I'm sad") aspects of various emotions (Harris, Olthof & 
Terwogt, 1981), and to experience two contrasting emotions simultaneously 
(Harter & Buddin, 1987). It is generally accepted that the transition from 
childhood to adolescence presents particular socioemotional challenges that 
require more sophisticated self-regulation skills in order to function effectively 
in social situations (Nottelman, 1987). With the transition from concrete to 
abstract thinking comes a greater focus on internal emotional states (Harris et 
al, 1981), which in turn contributes to a change in the personal meaning of 
emotions and improved emotion regulation. 
Second, emotion regulation is closely linked to social competence and the 
development of interpersonal relationships. The ability to self-regulate emotion 
impacts strongly on how people fare in their social interactions. 
Third, while children have a number of social and self-regulatory skills by 
the time they reach adolescence, there are specific developmental variables that 
impact further on social and self-regulatory skills during adolescence. Identity 
development, increasing coping strategies, the decline in egocentrism, and 
increasing abstract reasoning ability all impact on social and self-regulatory 
skills. 
1.3 Part three: The Present Research 
The research reviewed in this introduction has found that when people 
express positive emotion, they are judged as being more likable than when they 
do not express positive emotion (Clark et al., 1996; Godfrey, Jones & Lord, 1986; 
Schneider, Hastorf & Ellsworthy, 1979). The literature also suggests that it may 
be easier to express positive emotion when one is feeling positive than when 
one is not feeling positive (Parrott, 1993; Wegner & Erber, 1993). The deception 
literature suggests that, while it is possible to act in a way that is incongruent 
with one's internal emotional state, the internal emotional state may leak 
through body and vocal cues that can be perceived by observers (Fiske & 
Taylor, 1991). Therefore, if one has a social goal of being liked, and has planned 
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to express positive emotion, the elicitation of a congruent emotional state may 
help to facilitate that expression. This literature leaves some questions 
unanswered. For example, the relationship between experienced and expressed 
emotion in ingratiation tasks has not been attended to. In addition, there is little 
research directed specifically at the self-regulation of emotion for ingratiation 
purposes. For example, DePaulo (1992) proposed that the role of non-verbal 
expressiveness as a link between emotion and the impressions that are 
conveyed in social interactions is in need of empirical exploration. Similarly, 
Baumeister (1982) called for more research to establish whether an emotion can 
arise because it is called for by self-presentational motivations. Parkinson (1997) 
suggested that examining peoples' beliefs and practices in everyday social life 
may help in beginning to clarify the interpersonal goals motivating emotions 
and the ways in which these goals are interpreted and negotiated during real-
time encounters. 
The research reviewed in this introduction has also found that the 
development of emotion regulation in social situations during adolescence has 
received little attention, and so, in line with the research on adolescent 
development reviewed above, adolescents (aged 11-18) were chosen as the 
participants for this study. The relationship between age and the ability to 
express positivity in an ingratiation task, and relatedly, the relationship 
between age and likability was investigated. In addition, since the self-reflective 
and perspective-taking skills of younger adolescents might not be as well 
developed as those of older adolescents', the possibility that younger 
adolescents would not be as accurate in predicting the stranger's liking ratings 
of them as the older adolescents was explored. 
The present work investigated how positive mood and the expression of 
positive emotion affect the outcome of ingratiation strategies, the relationships 
between the experience and expression of emotion and whether emotion 
regulation is employed during such strategies. Participants interacted with a 
stranger and were given the instruction that they were to get the stranger to like 
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them. By inducing positive mood in half of the participants and neutral mood 
in the other half, it was predicted that those who were in a positive mood 
would be more effective in achieving that goal than those in a neutral mood, 
because those in a positive mood would express more positivity than those in a 
neutral mood. The distinction between experienced positive emotion and the 
expression of positive emotion was investigated by getting participants and the 
stranger to rate the participants' expression of positive emotion cues, and 
relating those ratings to the participants' ratings of their positive emotional 
experience. The two self-ratings of positive emotional experience were mood 
ratings and thought listing protocols. It was predicted that there would be a 
positive relationship between participants' experience of positive emotion and 
their expression of positive emotion. 
Since people know that being positive makes one likable, those in the 
neutral mood condition might self-induce positive mood in order to achieve 
their goal. Baumeister (1982) suggested (referring to work by Baumeister & 
Cooper, 1981; and Lanzetta, Cartwright-Smith & Kleck, 1976) that, when a 
person has a motive to express a particular emotion, his or her internal state 
will co-operate and furnish the desired level of emotion. So, it may be possible 
to make oneself feel happy when wanting to appear happy. By investigating 
participants in the neutral mood condition, it was hoped that some insight 
might be gained into the possible self-regulation of their emotional states in 
order to be positive during the interaction with the stranger. 
1.3.1 Methodological issues 
In an attempt to identify cues to positive emotions in the participants, a 
checklist of positive emotion cues was derived. Fridlund' s (1994) research 
indicated that using many cues to observe emotions has advantages, since 
single cues may have unclear interpretations and manifold causes. People 
scream, for example, because they're angry or because the stereo is too loud and 
they can't be heard. Fridlund suggested that multiple cues may be especially 
helpful in detecting emotions in others by triangulating the data and coming to 
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a more solid, trustworthy interpretation. It was therefore decided to use a range 
of cues in rating the emotional positivity of participants. It has been noted by 
many researchers that facial, speech and body cues are used in the detection of 
emotion, for example, eye contact, smiling, and rate and amount of speech 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Foot, Chapman & Smith, 1977; Garcia, Stinson, Ickes, 
Bissonnette & Briggs, 1991; Godfrey et al., 1986; Planalp et al., 1996; Thimm & 
Kruse, 1993). More abstract descriptors of interpersonal style, for example, 
JI friendly", JI assertive", JI positive", JI smooth, natural and relaxed", JI interested" 
and "enthusiastic" have also been used to define emotion in others (Garcia et 
al., 1991; Planalp et al., 1996; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988; Youngren & 
Lewinsohn, 1980). 
Consistent with the findings of this literature, nine items that reflect the 
cues associated with positive emotion (smiling, amount of speech, eye contact, 
friendly, natural, warm, encouraging, happy, positive) were included in the 
present research. In order to identify the likability of participants, a single 
measure of "liking" was included, (after Garcia et al., 1991, and Grush & Yehl, 
1979). The ten items (nine items reflecting the cues associated with positive 
emotion, and one item reflecting liking) were included in a single checklist, 
entitled the Making Friends Rating Scale. 
To be able to identify any strategies adolescents might use to deliberately 
manipulate their internal emotional states in order to make their experienced 
emotion congruent with their expressed emotion, thoughts and feelings were 
elicited from participants while they were planning how they would go about 
getting the stranger to like them. Similarly, to elicit positive and negative 
thoughts and feelings about the interaction, participants were asked to list these 
immediately after the social interaction. 
In order to determine whether participants thought that they had achieved 
their goal of being liked, and to get an idea of how they rated their own 
expressions of positive emotion, participants completed the Making Friends 
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Rating Scale immediately after the interaction, assessing how they had 
appeared to the stranger. Since people do not see their own facial expressions 
exactly as others do, they are deprived of an important source of online 
information about the kinds of impressions they may be conveying (DePaulo, 
1992). Therefore, the stranger also rated the participants on their emotional 
expressiveness. An independent observer who watched a videotape of the 
interaction completed the same checklist. The independent observer was 
included in order to counter the self-serving bias of the stranger's ratings. As 
discussed earlier, the autistic conspiracy is a phenomenon caused by the desire of 
ingratiators to conceal their ingratiation strategies, and the desire of targets to 
believe that the ingratiators are sincere in their positivity. By including the 
ratings of an observer who had no direct investment in the interaction, it was 
hoped to illuminate any self-serving biases of the stranger. The use of three 
raters for the measurement of emotional expression gave three different 
perspectives on that variable, and thereby the triangulation that makes 
measurement more accurate. 
Eisenberg, Fabes, Minore, et al. (1994) suggested that the use of hypothetical 
dilemmas enables researchers to elicit responses from all children to the same 
social situations (that is, allows for control of the stimuli to which children 
respond) and is economical for the time and resources needed to collect data. 
However, these authors refer to Mize and Ladd's (1988) argument that this 
methodology may tap higher level reasoning than is actually used in real life 
situations and may tap the child's ability to construct or consciously select a 
normatively valued strategy. Further, they suggest that enacted procedures 
may also elicit more emotion than do verbal procedures, with the consequence 
that children's responses are more realistic. Similarly, Garner (1996) proposed 
that children's social-cognitive skills are best assessed in a naturalistic versus a 
hypothetical situation. The evidence for cognitive developmental shifts during 
adolescence tends to come from controlled experimental situations which may 
tend to overestimate the sophistication of adolescents' thinking in everyday life, 
which often tends to pose time-limited, dynamic and personally stressful 
cognitive challenges (Keating & Clark, 1980). Therefore it was decided to use an 
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enacted task in which participants were faced with a stranger and were 
instructed to try and get her to like them without divulging their goal to her. 
While there was an element of the hypothetical in the initial planning task, the 
interaction was real, time-limited and dynamic. 
Garner (1996) suggested that future researchers investigating the 
importance of emotion skills for school-age children's social competence should 
consider matching the sex of the experimenter with the sex of the child. The 
author referred to Eisenberg and Lennon (1983) in which it was suggested that 
children's understanding of experimental material may be affected by the sex of 
the experimenter. Similarly, Wagner et al. (1993) suggested that the sex of the 
experimenter may influence the expression of emotion. Since the participants in 
the present study were to be recruited from a single sex, girls' secondary school, 
it was decided to use only females in the present study. The participants, 
experimenter, confederate and independent raters were all female. 
1.3.2 The research hypotheses 
Since this research attempted to answer some questions raised by a review 
of the relevant literatures, aims of this study were more inductive and 
exploratory than deductive and confirmatory. The plausible hypotheses 
presented from both the ingratiation literature and the developmental literature 
on emotion regulation were combined to construct the following research 
hypotheses: 
1. There will be a positive relationship behveen the participants' experience 
of positive emotion and their expression of positive emotion. 
This exploratory hypothesis was developed in order to investigate this 
relationship, since the existing research does not make the nature of the 
relationship clear in an ingratiation task. 
2. Adolescents who express more positive emotion will be more liked by the 
confederate and the observer. 
\ 
This prediction was developed to replicate, with reference to adolescents, the 
findings of other researchers who have proposed the existence of this 
relationship in adults. 
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3. Those participants in the neutral mood condition will self-regulate their 
emotions, making them positive during their interaction with the 
stranger. 
This exploratory hypothesis was developed from the arguments linking the 
expression of positive emotion, liking and the self-regulation of emotion. 
4. There will be a positive relationship between participants' age and their 
expression of positive emotion. 
This exploratory hypothesis was developed from the arguments linking 
adolescent development and expression of positive emotion. 
5. There will be a positive relationship between participants' age and the 
liking ratings of the confederate and the observer. 
This exploratory hypothesis was developed from the arguments linking 
adolescent development, expression of positive emotion and liking . 
6. There will be less consensus between the ratings of younger adolescents 
and the confederate and the observer, than between older adolescents and 
the confederate and observer. 
This exploratory hypothesis was developed from the arguments linking 




Eighty-two students were recruited from a local, single-sex, independent, 
secondary, girls' school. Information sheets and requests for participation were 
distributed to every girl in the school (n=680) to take home. These sheets 
included consent or refusal for participation from parent/ guardian and student 
(See Appendix A for form). There were 138 returns with 56 refusals and 82 
consents. Nine participants completed the procedtrre for the pilot study and 59 
participants completed the procedme for the main study. 
The first 10 participants to return their consent forms were assigned to the 
pilot study. The mean age of participants in the pilot study was 13 years 2 
months (SD= 2 years 10 months). The minimum age was 11 years 4 months and 
the maximum age was 17 years 8 months. Participants were randomly assigned 
to either the Mood Induction: Neutral (NMI) condition or the Mood Induction: 
Positive (PMI) condition. Nine participants completed this procedure (1 failed 
to arrive for her appointment) - 5 in the Neutral condition and 4 in the Positive 
condition. 
The remaining 72 participants were assigned to the main study. A total of 59 
participants completed the procedure for the main study (13 participants failed 
to arrive for their appointments) - 30 in the NMI condition and 29 in the PMI 
condition. The mean age of the participants in the main study was 14 years 1 
month (SD= 1 year 11 months). The minimum age was 11years 5 months and 
the maximum age was 17 years 9 months. There was no significant difference in 
the age of participants in the NMI and the PMI conditions. Participants were 
assigned to one of 4 age categories: 11-12 (n=17), 13 -14 (n=16), 15 -16 (n=15), 
17-18 (n=11). Half of the participants in each age category were randomly 
assigned (by card sorting) to each mood induction condition and randomly 
assigned appointment times. 
A 2 (Mood Induction: Neutral/Positive) X 4 (Age Category: 11-12/13-
14/15-16/17-18) between-subjects design was used. 
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The female confederate was recruited from the Psychology Ph.D. 
programme at the University of Canterbury and was paid for her participation 
in the study. The confederate was blind to the purpose of the study and to the 
mood induction condition of each participant throughout the experiment. She 
was informed that she would be spending 5 minutes with each participant in a 
"getting-to-know-you" session, and that this would be videotaped. She was 
also informed that she would be asked to complete a checklist about each 
participant immediately after the interaction. 
2.2 Materials 
2.2.1 Mood thermometer 
The mood thermometer was a visual reproduction of a standard 
temperature thermometer, placed vertically on an A4 page, 265mm long, and 
with markings 1 mm apart. There were 3 anchors - "very negative" at the 
bottom of the thermometer, "very positive" at the top of the thermometer and 
"neutral" at the half-way mark (See Appendix B). The participant was given the 
following instructions, "I want you to think about how you are feeling right 
now. This mood thermometer measures mood from 'very negative' (the worst 
you ever felt in your life) to 'very positive' (the best you ever felt in your life) 
with 'neutral' (neither good nor bad) in the middle. Please make a line across 
the thermometer that shows how you are feeling right now''. Each mood rating 
was done on a separate page. One mm was equivalent to a score of 1. Possible 
scores ranged from O (most negative) to 265 (most positive) with 133 being 
neutral. 
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2.2.2 Thought listing protocols 
Participants were asked to list their thoughts at 2 stages during the 
experiment: 1) While they were planning what they would say and do in order 
to get the confederate to like them, and what feelings they thought would be 
instrumental in achieving this goal; and 2) While they were retrospectively 
reflecting on the interaction. These protocols were adapted from Garcia et al., 
(1991), Osterhouse & Brock (1970), and Petty, Wells & Brock (1976). 
Planning Thought Listing Task 
An A4 sheet was prepared with 8 boxes and the following instructions at 
the top, "I am interested in the plans you are making in order to get the stranger 
to like you. I want you to think about what you will say and do, and what 
feelings inside you will help to make her like you, for example, being sad, 
angry, happy or excited. Simply list the plans as they occur to you, the first one 
in the first box, the second in the second box and so on. Please put only one 
plan in each box. Don't worry about grammar or spelling, just write down your 
plans. You will be given 2 minutes to complete this task. Don't worry about 
filling all the boxes - I've given you more than I think you will need. Please be 
honest (there are no right or wrong plans)." (See Appendix C) 
Interaction Thought Listing Task 
An A4 sheet was prepared with 8 boxes and the following instructions at 
the top, "I now want to know what you were thinking and feeling during your 
time with Meg. Simply list the thoughts and feelings as you remember them, 
the first one in the first box, the second in the second box and so on. Please put 
only one thought or feeling in each box. Don't worry about grammar or 
spelling, just write down your thoughts and feelings. You will be given 2 
minutes to complete this task. Don't worry about filling all the boxes - I've 
given you more than I think you will need. Please be honest (there are no right 
or wrong thoughts and feelings)". (See Appendix D) 
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2.2.3 The Making Friends Rating Scale 
The Making Friends Rating Scale was devised with 10 items. The first item 
measured overall liking and the following 9 items measured cues to positive 
emotion 
Item 1: The participant was rated on an overall measure of liking, phrased as, 
"How much did you like the participant?" 
Items 2-10: The participant was rated on 9 items measuring cues to positive 
emotional expression associated with liking (friendly, natural, warm, 
encouraging, happy, positive, smiling, talking, eye contact). These cues were 
presented in the phrasing "How friendly (natural, warm, encouraging, happy, 
positive) do you think she appeared?" and "How much do you think she 
smiled?", "How much do you think she talked?" and "How much eye contact 
do you think she made?" 
All ratings were made on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = "not at all" and 7 = 
"very much"). There were 2 forms of the checklist-1 for the participant, and 1 
for the confederate, experimenter and independent coder. Each form was 
directed at the participant's performance, for example, the checklist for the 
participant asked the question "How much do you think the stranger liked 
you?" while the checklist for the confederate, experimenter and the 
independent coder asked, "How much did you like the participant?" (See 
Appendix E). 
The experimenter (an adult female) and an independent coder (another 
adult female who was blind to the purpose of the study and to the mood 
induction condition of each participant) independently completed the same 
checklist after watching the videotaped interaction. The inter-rater reliability of 
the raters was tested in the pilot study. The experimenter and an independent 
coder separately completed the Making Friends Rating Scale for each 
participant after watching the videotaped interaction. The scores of the 2 raters 
for the first item, "How much did you like the participant?" correlated highly 
(r = .80, p<.01). A total score of the other 9 items was computed for each 
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participant. The totals of the 2 raters for the other 9 items also correlated highly 
(r = .82, p<.01). After these analyses were completed, interpretation of the 9 
items was discussed and standardised in order to further increase reliability. 
For example, it was decided to interpret "natural" as "not trying too hard", 
"happy" was interpreted as "lack of anxiety", "warm" was interpreted as "self 
disclosure" and "asking personal questions", "positive" was interpreted as "self 
confidence". It was decided that, for the main study, ratings would be made 
individually and then compared. Differences in item scores would be resolved 
through discussion (after re-viewing the videotapes) as far as possible. 
2.2.4 Mood Induction Techniques 
Positive Mood was induced by asking the participant to recall an event that 
made her feel particularly happy. While the participant talked about the event 
for one minute, the experimenter reinforced words relating to positive emotion, 
for example, "You must have been very happy" or "That must have felt very 
good", or "Tell me what it felt like". This procedure was adapted from Fabes, 
Eisenberg, Fultz and Miller (1988). Neutral Mood was induced by asking the 
participant to describe the room she was in by naming and numbering the 
objects in the room. Participants were given one minute to talk while the 
experimenter remained neutral throughout this minute, giving no 
encouragement or positive feedback. This procedure was adapted from Stegge, 
Terwogt and Koops (1994). 
The mood induction procedure was tested in the pilot study. There was a 
significant difference between the two mood induction groups for Induction 
Mood (NMI mean= 15.80 (5D=12.75), PMI mean= 77.75 (SD=S.44), t(7)= -8.98, 
p<.0001). Therefore, the mood induction was successful. 
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2.3 Pilot Study 
In order to pilot test the mood induction procedure, and establish inter-
rater reliability on the liking measures for the experimenter and the 
independent coder, a pilot study was completed. The pilot study consisted of 
the same procedure as the main study (see Procedure) except that the mood 
induction was done before the planning thought listing task. It was noticed that 
the planning thought listing task cancelled out the positive mood induction, 
resulting in all participants being in a neutral, or lower, mood immediately 
before the interaction. Therefore, the planning thought listing task was 
completed before the mood induction procedure for the main study. Relevant 
results of the pilot study have been discussed. In summary, the pilot study 
established that the mood induction techniques were effective and that there 
was satisfactory interrater reliability for the Making Friends Rating Scale. 
2.4 Procedure 
Participants waited alone in an ante room before the experimental session 
and were tested individually in an experimental room. This room was set up 
with 2 chairs facing each other on one side of the room and a video camera on 
the opposite side of the room, facing the chair used by the participants. In order 
to have a frontal view of the participants' faces, only the participant's head and 
chest were videotaped. The confederate was not in view, but her voice was 
audible on the videotape. 
Initially, two minutes was spent building rapport. The experimenter 
introduced herself, welcomed the participant and asked her about her classes. 
In order to establish a base mood, the participant was then asked to rate her 
current mood state by marking a mood thermometer. Once she had done this, 
she was informed that she would be marking a mood thermometer another 
three times during the experiment, and that each time she should ignore her 
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previous responses, and mark the thermometer according to her mood at that 
time. She was then told that she would be meeting a stranger, and that her task 
was to try and get the stranger to like her. She was instructed not to tell the 
confederate that she was trying what her goal was. The experimenter explained 
that everyone wants to be liked and that, under everyday conditions, people go 
about pursuing that goal without thinking too much about it. The experimenter 
then requested the participant to think about how she would go about getting 
the stranger to like her, paying particular attention to what she would do and 
what feelings she thought would be helpful. The participant then completed the 
planning thought listing task. After completion of the thought listing task, she 
was asked to rate her mood again (planning mood). The mood induction 
procedure followed and after the mood induction, the participant was asked to 
rate her mood again (induction mood). The experimenter then left the room to 
call the confederate (who was in a room adjacent to the interview room) and 
brought her into the interview room. The interviewer introduced the 
participant to the confederate by saying, " __ this is Meg: Meg, this is _ ". 
The confederate sat in the chair that the experimenter had been using. The 
experimenter gave the following standardised instruction, "I'm going to switch 
the videotape on and make sure it's working. Good. See you in five minutes". 
The experimenter then left the interview room for five minutes. The interaction 
was videotaped. After five minutes, the experimenter knocked on the door, 
entered the interview room and said, "Thank you, Meg". The confederate said, 
"Nice to meet you" to the participant and left the room. After the confederate 
left, the participant was asked to rate her mood once more (task mood), and then 
complete the Making Friends Rating Scale as detailed in the Materials section. 
The final task for the participant was to complete the interaction thought listing 
task. 
The participant was then warmly thanked for her participation and was 
assured of the value of her contribution to this research. The experimenter 
asked the participant not to reveal any details of the experiment to anyone who 
had not been through the procedure. Finally, the experimenter asked the 
participant to express her thoughts and feelings about her experience of the 
experiment and all positive thoughts and feelings were reinforced by the 
experimenter. This was done in order to ensure that each participant left the 
experiment in a positive mood. (See Appendix F for complete script used by 
the experimenter). 
The confederate completed the Making Friends Rating Scale for each 
participant immediately after each interaction session. At a later time, the 
experimenter and an independent coder separately completed the Making 
Friends Rating Scale for each participant after watching the videotaped 
interactions. 
Once all participants had completed the procedure, a debriefing 
information sheet was sent to each participant, outlining the aims, and 
explaining the procedures of the study. (Appendix H). No indications of 
findings were given to participants at that time. 
This study was reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury 
Human Ethics Committee (Appendix I). 
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3. RESULTS 
The results are presented in 4 sections: Mood ratings; Thought listing 
(Coding procedures and Analyses); Liking (Internal consistency of the 
checklist, Experimenter and Independent coder reliability, and Analyses); 
Correlations; and Regression Analyses. 
3.1 Mood ratings 
Mood ratings were made by the participants at four phases during the 
experiment: A base mood at the beginning, a planning mood after completing 
the planning exercise, an induction mood after the induction procedure and a 
task mood after the interaction with the confederate. The possible minimum 
and maximum scores were 0 and 265 respectively, with a higher score 
indicating more positive mood. 
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A 2 (Mood Induction: Neutral/Positive) X 4 (Age category:11-12/13 -14/15 
-16/17-18) X 4 (Phases: Base mood/Planning mood/Induction mood/Task 
mood) mixed model ANOV A with repeated measures on the third factor 
revealed a significant main effect of phases, F(3,153) = 32.82, p<.0001, which was 
qualified by a significant interaction between mood induction and phases, 
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--o- Mood Induction: 
Neutral - NMI 
Mood Induction: 
Task mood Positive - PMI 
Figure 1. Mean mood ratings as a function of mood induction and phases of the 
experiment. 
Post hoc analyses were conducted between the positive and neutral mood 
induction conditions for each phase and separately for each mood induction 
condition. Tukey Honesty Significant Difference for unequal N (HSD-un) tests 
(p<.001) showed the following significant results: 
1. There was a difference between the positive and neutral mood induction 
conditions (NMI and PMI) for induction mood only, (Ms= 8.57 (SD=12.33) 
vs 51.31 (SD=30.59)). 
2. For the PMI condition, the only significant difference between phases was 
between the planning mood and induction mood (Ms= 13.28 (SD=32.26) vs 
51.31 (SD=30.59)). 
3. For the NMI condition, the only difference between phases was between the 
induction mood and task mood (Ms= 8.57 (SD=12.33) vs 50.70 (SD=31.64)). 
Therefore, the mood induction was effective in raising the mood of 
participants in the PMI condition above that for participants in the NMI 
condition. For the PMI participants, the positive mood induction elevated mood 
53 
from the planning phase, and this elevated mood was maintained throughout 
the interaction with the confederate. For the NMI participants, mood was 
elevated during the interaction with the confederate, up to the same level as the 
PMI participants after the interaction. 
3.2 Thought Listing 
3.2.1 Coding procedures 
The following criteria were adopted for coding of the two thought listing 
protocols (planning and interaction): 
1. Only positive and negative statements were coded. Neutral statements like, 
"I was thinking about what she looked like" were not coded. From a total of 
645 statements there were only 4 such neutral statements (0.6% ). 
2. Repetitions were excluded. For example, if a participant wrote "I will act 
happy" and also wrote, "I will be happy", only one statement was coded. 
However, variations of a word with a similru· meaning, such as "happy" and 
"cheerful" were coded separately. 
3. Negations of a previously coded statement were excluded. For example, if a 
participant wrote, "I will be relaxed" and later wrote, "I will not be tense", 
only one statement was coded. 
Positivity and negativity of thoughts were measured by calculating the 
percentage of a participant's thoughts that were positive and negative. This 
calculation was done separately for the Planning task and the Interaction task, 
giving 4 scores -percentage planning positivity (%PP), percentage planning 
negativity (%PN), percentage task positivity (% 1P), and percentage task 
negativity(% 1N). Since positivity and negativity are necessarily 
complementary for each task, only percentage positivity (%PP, % 1P) was 
included in subsequent analyses. (See Appendix G for examples of thoughts 
and feelings from planning and interaction thought listing tasks). 
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3.2.2 Analyses 
A 2 (Mood Induction: Neutral/Positive) X 4 (Age category:11-12/13-14/15-
16/17-18) X 2 (Time: %PP/% TP) mixed model ANOVA with repeated measures 
on the third factor revealed only a main effect of time, F(l,51)=123.54, p<.0001. 
A higher percentage of statements were positive in the planning task compared 
with the interaction task (100% vs 58.99%) 
3.3 Liking 
3.3.1 Internal consistency of the checklist 
As discussed previously, overall liking was rated by the first item in the 
checklist (minimum = 1, maximum = 7). 
A principal components analysis of the remaining 9 emotion items related 
to liking (friendly, natural, warm, encouraging, happy, positive, smiling, 
talking, eye contact) across all 4 raters for all participants (236 cases) revealed a 
large single factor, on which every item loaded at .70 or higher. The Eigenvalue 
of the factor was 5. 93, thereby accounting for 59.3 of the variance in the ratings. 
Since the internal consistency of the 9 items was high, it was decided to collapse 
the 9 item scores, and use the mean of their aggregated score (minimum 1, 
maximum 7) as a single score of the positive emotion cues related to liking 
(positive emotion). The Pearson Product Moment correlation between the single 
item of overall liking and the single score of positive emotion was r = .63 
(p<.001) 
3.3.2 Experimenter and independent coder reliability 
The experimenter's liking ratings and positive emotion ratings correlated 
with the independent coder's liking ratings and positive emotion ratings, 
respectively, r = 0.99, and r = 0.97 (p<.01). On the basis of these high 
correlations, means were calculated of the experimenter's and the independent 
coder's ratings and these were subsequently used as the observer measures (0). 
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Therefore, there were 3 raters used in the analyses - the participant (P), the 
confederate (C), and the observer (0), and 2 measures - liking and positive 
emotion. 
3.3.3 Analyses 
A 2 (Mood Induction: Neutral/Positive) X 4 (Age category:11-12/13-14/15 
-16/17-18) X 3 (Rater: P /C/0) mixed model ANOVA with repeated measures 
on the thil'd factor for the liking measure only, revealed a significant main effect 
of age category, F(3,51)=3.03, p<.05. This main effect was qualified by a 
significant interaction between age category and rater, F(6,102)=2.19, p<.05. This 
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Figure 2. Mean liking ratings as a function of age category and rater 
Post hoc analyses (Tukey HSD-un tests) conducted separately between the 
age categories for each rater and between the raters for each age category, 
revealed only the following result that was significant: 
1. The confederate rated the 17-18 age category higher than the 13-14 age 
category (Ms= 5.64 (SD=.67) vs 4.42 (SD=l.14), p=.05) 
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A 2 (Mood Induction: Neutral/Positive) X 4 (Age category: 11-12/13 -14/15 -
16/17-18) X 3 (Rater: P /C/0), mixed model ANOVA with repeated measures 
on the third factor for the emotion measure only revealed a significant main 
effect of age category F(3,51)=3.14, p<.05 and a main effect of rater, F(2,102) = 
44.58, p<.0001. These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction 
between age category and rater, F(6,102)=2.09, p<.05. This interaction is 
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Figute 3. Mean positive emotion expression ratings as a function of age 
category and rater 
Post hoc analyses (Tu.key HSD-un tests) conducted separately between the 
age categories for each rater and between the raters for each age category, 
revealed the following significant results: 
1. In the 11-12 age category, participants rated themselves higher than either 
the confederate or the observer who did not differ from one another (Ms= 
(P) 5.29 (SD=.84) vs (C) 3.82 (SD=.98) vs (0) 4.12 (SD=.95), p<.001). 
2. In the 13-14 age category, participants rated themselves higher than either 
the confederate or the observer who did not differ from one another (Ms= 
(P) 5.30 (SD=.69) vs (C) 4.17 (SD=.86) vs (0) 4.37 (SD=.61), p<.001). 
3. In the 15-16 age category, participants rated themselves highet than the 
confederate (Ms= (P) 5.42 (SD=.57) vs (C) 4.56 (SD=.70), p<.01). 
4. The confederate rated the 17-18 age category higher than the 11-12 age 
category (Ms= 4.82 (SD=.49) vs 3.81(5D=.98), p<.01). 
5. The observer rated the 17-18 age category higher than the 11-12 age 
category (Ms= 4.94 (SD=.68) vs 4.ll(SD=.95), p<.05). 
3.4 Correlations 
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In order to investigate the relationships between the raters' measures of 
liking and positive emotion, age, taskmood and percentage positivity about the 
task, Pearson Product Moment correlations were computed with these 
variables. Since there was no effect of mood induction on liking, the positive 
emotion measure or on percentage positivity or negativity for the planning 
exercise or the interaction task, it was decided to collapse the data across the 
two mood induction conditions for the purpose of the next two analyses. There 
was no variance in percentage positivity and negativity for the planning 
exercise (100 percent and 0 percent respectively), so these were not included in 
the variables analysed. Since percentage negativity about the task and 
percentage positivity about the task are necessarily complementary, only 
percentage positivity about the task was included. Age was entered as a 
continuous variable in order to be able to include it in the analysis. The 
correlation matrix is presented in Table 1. 
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Age Task Llking Liking Llking Pos.Em. Pos.Em. Pos.Em. % TP 
Mood (P) (C) (0) (P) (C) (0) 
Age 
Taskmood -.20 
Liking (P) -.10 .36** 
Liking (C) .25* .11 .34* 
Liking (0) .45** -.09 -.09 .33** 
Pos.Em. (P) -.02 .36** .48** .42** .18 
Pos.Em. (C) .41** -.19 .10 
Pos.Em. (0) .37** -.13 -.02 
.68** .59** .28* 
.39** .87** .25* 
%TP .03 .37** .46** .34** -.00 
.71** 
.15 .05 
Table 1. Pearson Product Moment correlations (n=59) between the raters' 
measures of liking and positive emotion expression, age, taskmood and the 
percentage task positivity measure. 
(*=p<.05; **= p<.01). % TP=percentage positivity about the task. 
Pos.Em.= Positive emotion expression. 
1. Liking and positive emotion correlated for the participant, for the 
confederate, and for the observer. 
2. Taskmood was positively related to all three of the participant's ratings; her 
percentage positivity about the task, her rating of her expression of positive 
emotion and how much she thought the confederate liked her. However, 
taskmood was unrelated to the confederate or observer's liking ratings or 
ratings of positive emotion. 
2. The participant's rating of how much she thought the confederate liked her 
was positively related to how much the confederate did like her, but was 
unrelated to the observer's liking rating. 
3. The confederate's liking rating was positively related to the participant's 
liking rating and the observer's liking rating; the confederate's liking rating 
was also positively related to all three of the ratings of positive emotion 
expression. 
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4. The participant's rating of positive emotional expression was related to the 
confederate and the observer's ratings of positive emotional expression (for 
the observer, this relationship was marginally significant, p=.055). 
5. The participant's age was related to the confederate's liking rating (this 
relationship was marginally signilicant, p=.055) and the observer's ratings of 
liking and positive emotion. 
3.5 Regression analyses 
In order to be able to identify which variables predicted liking, three 
multiple regression analyses were conducted with liking ratings for the 
participant, confederate and observer serving as the dependent variables. One 
of the main research questions was whether positive mood in the ingratiator 
increased liking in others; therefore, the taskmood of the participants was also 
included. Age was again entered as a continuous variable. The predictor 
variables included were taskmood, age, positive emotion ratings and 
percentage positivity about the task For the participant, the confederate's liking 
rating was included in order to investigate the effect of the confederate's liking 
rating on the participant's liking rating. Similarly, for the confederate, the 
participant's liking rating was included. For the observer, the liking ratings of 
both the participant and the confederate were included. 
The participant 
The overall regression analysis was signilicant, F(S,53) = 5.74, p<.001. 
There were two marginally significant effects. 
(a) The effect of the participant's positive emotion rating wasp= .250, t(53) = 
1.85, p=.06 
(b) The effect of percentage positivity about the task wasp= .249, t(53) = 1.19, 
p=.06 
The amount of variance accounted for by the variables included in this analysis 
was 28.99% (R2 = .2899). 
The confederate 
The overall regression analysis was significant, F(5,53) = 13.43, p<.0001. 
There was only a reliable effect of the confederate's positive emotion rating, f3 
=.664, t(53) = 6.37, p<.001. The amount of variance accounted for by the 
variables included in the analysis was 51.73% (R2 = .5173) 
The observer 
The overall regression analysis was significant, F(6,52) = 31.37, p<.0001. 
There were two reliable effects. 
(a) The effect of the observer's positive emotion rating was reliable, f3 =.819, 
t(52) = 11.03, p<.001. 
(b) The effect of age category was reliable, f3 =.157, t(52) = 2.20, p<.05. 
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The amount of variance accounted for by the variables included in the analysis 
was 75.85% (R2 = .7585). 
In summary, the participants' positivity about the task and their self-rating 
of positive emotion predicted how much they thought the confederate liked 
them. The confederate's positive emotion rating of the participants predicted 
how much she liked the participants. For the observer, both her positive 
emotion ratings of the participants and the participants' age category predicted 
how much she liked the participants. The variables included in the analyses 
accounted for differential percentages of the variance in each dependent 
variable. For the participant, the variables entered in the analyses accounted for 
only about 30 percent of the variance. For the confederate, this percentage 
increased to almost 50 percent and for the observer it increased further to 
almost 75 percent. 
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4. DISCUSSION 
The main results of this study can be as summarised as follows: the mood 
induction procedure was successful; the mood of participants in the neutral 
mood condition became elevated during the interaction task; the measure of 
positive emotion expression predicted liking for all three raters; both the 
confederate and observer rated the older participants higher than the younger 
participants on the expression of positive emotion; the age of the participants 
predicted only the observer's liking ratings; the consensus between 
participants' self-ratings of positive emotion expression and the confederate 
and observer's ratings of the same was lowest in the youngest age category and 
higher in each older category. 
In view of the complexity of the results and the number of hypotheses being 
investigated, a model was developed to provide a framework for the results 
summarised above. The constituents of the model represent the variables that 
were investigated in the present study and processes described in the relevant 
literature. The participant, the confederate and the observer were 
conceptualised as being part of an ingratiation system comprising all 
constituents in dynamic interaction. Once the model was explicated, 
explanatory theory was developed to account for the ingratiation system. The 
relationships between the constituents of the model were posited by integrating 
the present results and substantive theory in the domain. The model has been 
named the Expressiveness, Liking and Links to Emotion (ELLE) model, and 
integrates cognitive, emotional and behavioral aspects of the processes 
plausibly involved in the ingratiation task ELLE is illustrated in Figure 4. 
Participant Confederate 
(a) Self-theories (b) 
goal of being liked 
(c) monitoring of 
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participant's positive emotional 
cues 
Observer 
---•- = Intrapersonal processes ---------· = Interpersonal processes 
Italics represent moderating processes 
Figure 4. An integrated model of the constituents of the ingratiation system 
(ELLE) 
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The results of the present research map onto the model in the following 
way: Task mood ratings are contained in "mood"; thought listing analyses are 
contained in the "cognitions about the task"; liking ratings made by the 
confederate and the observer are contained in the two "liking" constituents, and 
the liking rating made by the participant is contained in the "goal of being liked 
and monitoring of progress towards the goal" constituent; ratings of positive 
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emotional expression made by the confederate and the observer are contained 
in the "perception and utilisation of participant's available emotional cues" 
constituents, and self-ratings of positive emotional expression are contained in 
the "perception and utilisation of own emotional cues". The results will now be 
used to make links between the constituents. First, the correlations in Table 1 
and the regression analyses (section 3.5) show the relationships between the 
participant's intrapersonal processes (monitoring of progress towards the goal of 
being liked, mood, cognitions about the task, perception and utilisation of her 
own positive emotion cues). Similarly, the correlations in Table 1 and the 
regression analyses show the relationships between the intrapersonal processes 
of the confederate and the observer (ratings of positive emotion expression and 
liking ratings). The emphasis in the present research was on the participant, and 
this is reflected in the large number of intrapersonal relationships for the 
participant. Should the emphasis have been on the confederate, it is likely that 
the number of intrapersonal relationships for the confederate would have been 
greater. It is also likely that many of the intrapersonal processes depicted for the 
participant are common to the confederate and the observer as well. 
Intrapersonal relationships between constituents are illustrated in ELLE by 
solid arrows. The interpersonal relationships between constituents, taken from 
the same sources as the intrapersonal relationships, are illustrated in ELLE by 
broken lines. 
The present results have been integrated with the theories of interpersonal 
perception proposed by Kenny (1994) and Funder (1995), and the theory of 
Interpersonal Facial Feedback proposed by Cappella (1993). Cappella's (1993) 
proposal of the existence of an affective loop between persons in a dyad 
characterises the ingratiation system as comprising intrapersonal and 
interpersonal constituents. The affective loop is made possible by the existence 
of separate expressive and experiential emotional subsystems, and the 
interactive effects of participants' emotional expression on each other's 
emotional experience. The assumption is that the valence of the emotional 
expression of one person induces a matching valence in the expression and 
experience of the other. 
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As a result, there are processes included in ELLE that were not directly 
addressed in the present work. However, it is necessary to incorporate these in 
order to produce a coherent theory to account for the results obtained in this 
study. 
Since ELLE is presented as a general model of the processes and 
relationships involved in an ingratiation system, and should therefore apply 
irrespective of age, the independent variable of age will be addressed as a 
separate issue later in the discussion. 
Intrapersonal processes 
Kenny (1994) proposed that meta-perception (the participant1s ratings of 
how much they thought the confederate liked them) is the result of self-
perception (theories about, and observations of, the self). In ELLE, this theory 
would account for the relationships between the participant's: emotional 
expression, the perception and utilisation of their own cues to emotion, mood, 
percentage positivity about the task, self-theories, and monitoring of progress 
towards the goal of being liked. The relationship between emotional expression 
and mood is further supported by Capella's (1993) description of an 
experiential emotional subsystem, in which one's mood is directly influenced 
by one's facial expression. 
Participants could have made judgements about how much the confederate 
liked them based on self-perceptions. Some of the thoughts from the thought 
listing protocols support this notion. For example, statements like, "I thought of 
heaps of things to say", "I wanted to carry on", "I thought I seemed a bit eager", 
"I felt happy/ curious/ positive/ interested/ excited" suggest that participants 
were monitoring their own thoughts, feelings and behaviors. This could have 
contributed to their ratings of how much they thought the confederate liked 
65 
them. The strong positive correlations found between participants' positivity 
about the task and self-ratings of liking support this possibility. In this case, the 
participants' judgements of how much the confederate liked them will have 
been partly dependant on the positive cues they perceived in themselves, and 
will have been directly influenced by their mood, percentage positivity about 
the task and perception of their own cues to emotion. The present results 
concur with the relevant aspects of Kenny and Cappella' s theories mentioned 
immediately above. 
A further contributing factor to percentage positivity about the task might 
have been participants' expectations of success. Bandura (1989) has long 
espoused the notion that self-efficacy is a major motivator in human action and 
goal setting and striving, and the causal contribution of self-efficacy beliefs to 
human functioning has been well researched (for a summary of this research 
see Bandura, 1989). Bandura (1991b) extends the theory of self-efficacy to the 
exercise of control over social environments. Beliefs about self-efficacy will form 
part of the self-theories contained in ELLE. Therefore, in the present research, it 
is likely that participants' beliefs about their ability to make the confederate like 
them will have affected the intrapersonal processes illustrated in ELLE. For 
example, a belief that one is socially inept could reduce ingratiation attempts 
and produce negative emotion in the system. However, this issue was not 
addressed by the present research and is in need of further investigation. 
If, as has been suggested previously, people self-induce positive mood in 
order to make their expression of positive mood congruent with their 
experienced emotion in an ingratiation task (Baumeister, 1982; Hochschild, 
1983; Parkinson, 1991), then the strategic self-induction of positive mood will 
directly influence both cognitions about the task and emotional expressiveness. 
Similarly, the use of display rules will impact directly on the participants' 
emotional expression (Ekman, 1972; Malatesta, et al., 1989; Saarni, 1990; Saarni 
& von Salisch, 1993), and thereby their mood. The adoption of socially 
sanctioned facial expressions of positivity would trigger the facial feedback 
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mechanism that could elevate mood. While these processes have been described 
by the researchers cited above, the present research explicitly integrates these 
processes into the ingratiation system. 
Interpersonal processes 
The positive relationship between both the confederate and observer's 
liking ratings and their respective ratings of the participants' positive 
expression of emotion can be explained by Funder's (1995) RAM. By detecting 
and utilising the available cues to positive emotion in the participants' 
expressiveness, the confederate might have made her judgement of liking. The 
participant's emotional expression would also have been detected and utilised 
by the observer in her judgements of liking. 
According to Funder's RAM, the participant would have detected 
available, relevant cues in the target's behavior, and from the utilisation of these 
would have judged how much the confederate liked her. Some of the thoughts 
from the interaction thought lists support this notion. For example, statements 
like "she looked interested", "she was encouraging", "we got on well" suggest 
that participants were looking to the confederate for cues to her positive 
emotion. These detected cues might have increased positivity about the task 
and thereby affected participants' judgement of the impression they were 
making. ELLE suggests that the participants used cues both from the 
confederate and from the self, not one or the other. 
Cappella's (1993) Interpersonal Facial Feedback Hypothesis proposed a 
further effect of the participant and the confederate's emotional expression on 
each other, that of behavioral matching. The process of behavioral matching has 
been researched by Cappella (1997), Gergen and Wishnov (1965), Newtson and 
Czerlinsky (1974), and Schlenker and Goldman (1982). Imitating another's 
behaviors is an indirect form of flattery, often used as an ingratiation strategy. 
Cappella (1995) has argued that the imitation of partners' smiling in social 
interactions is a behavior that has evolved as part of social co-operation. Thus, 
the participant will imitate the confederate's positive emotional expressions, 
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and the very act of this expression may give rise to positive mood, according to 
the facial feedback hypothesis. Consequently, the participant's judgement of 
how much she is liked will derive from a path running from the confederate's 
emotional expression to the participant's imitation of that expression, 
subsequent mood elevation and consequent positivity about the task due to the 
perception of that elevated mood and positive emotional expression. The 
confederate's rating of the participant's emotion expression may be based on 
that matched emotion expression, which will have been magnified by a 
feedback path from positivity about the task, via elevated mood to emotional 
expression. Additionally, it is possible that the confederate's own positive 
emotional expression and consequent mood elevation may have affected her 
utilisation of the participant's available emotional cues. In the present research, 
the confederate did not rate her mood, nor did the participants rate her on her 
emotional expression. Therefore, it was not possible to explore these 
possibilities. 
It must be noted that, since it was positive emotion that was investigated in 
the present research, there is an assumption of positive emotional expression on 
the part of the confederate in this discussion. It is not within the scope of this 
thesis to lay out the various factors that could influence the confederate's 
expression of emotion. Suffice it to say that factors like reciprocal behavioral 
matching (Cappella, 1993; Ekman, 1972; Malatesta et al., 1989; Saarni, 1990) 
would impact on the confederate's emotional expression. If the confederate's 
emotional expression is negative, the emotional content of the affective loop 
will presumably become negative. However, the ingratiation strategies shown 
in ELLE are not part of this affective loop, as positive emotional experience and 
expression can be self-induced by the participant in the face of negatively 
valenced emotional expression by the confederate. Therefore, they can be 
implemented without reference to the confederate's emotional experience. 
Thus, the self-regulation of emotion and application of display rules proposed 
as ingratiation strategies are outside of the affective loop proposed by Cappella 
(1993) and are independent of the confederate's emotional expression. These 
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processes can therefore be seen as adaptive strategies for overcoming resistance 
or negative feedback from the confederate. Either by using display rules to 
adopt positive expressions, or by self-inducing positive mood, participants 
could have generated positive emotional experience and expression. It may be 
that participants were able to present positive emotion effectively despite some 
negative emotional internal experience (only 59% of their thoughts about the 
task were positive). This ability may have been a function of their knowledge of 
display rules. The results suggest that all of the participants in this study were 
aware of the display rules operating in their culture. Participants planned to be 
100% positive about the task (that is, every statement made during the planning 
exercise reflected an intention by the planner to express positive emotion). See 
Appendix G for lists of positive planning behaviors and positive planning 
feelings. It is clear that all participants believed that expressing positive 
emotion would make them more likable. It may well be the case that the sample 
of the population, who were participants in this study, have been thoroughly 
taught (by parents and other adults) the appropriate ways in which to behave 
when trying to make a friend. Although the cultural affiliations of the 
participants were mixed, they were all attending a school that represents main.-
stream, western cultural values. It remains for future research to determine 
whether participants of different sex, socio-economic status, and within 
different socio-cultural contexts, would have the same ideas about how to go 
about being liked. 
Having presented the results in the form of a model (ELLE), and having 
integrated these results with substantive theory in order to explain the 
processes in the model, the discussion of the results will follow the order of the 
six research hypotheses presented in the introduction. This will be followed by 
conclusions, limitations and implications of the present research, and directions 
for future research. 
Before discussing the research hypotheses, it is necessary to clarify the 
relationship between correlational data and causality. In social science research 
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researchers are frequently concerned with drawing causal inferences from 
correlational data. They proceed mindful of the statistical adage that correlation 
does not imply causation. In the simplest case, this adage is generally taken to 
mean that a correlation between two variables, X and Y, alone, is not sufficient 
for inferring the particular causal relationship "X causes Y" (Haig, 1992). 
Woodward (1989) argues that decisions about which variables to include in 
regression analyses, or causal modeling more generally, appeal to general 
theoretical considerations about whether the predictor variables are possible 
causes of changes in the dependant variables. By considering well-developed 
theory, together with correlations in the results, it is legitimate to make 
inferences about causality. Since the results of the present study are integrated 
with substantive theory, this discussion will frequently make reference to 
causality. 
4.1 Hypothesis 1 
There will be a positive relationship between the participants' experience of 
positive emotion and their expression of positive emotion. 
In order to explore this hypothesis, the relationships between the 
participants' self-ratings of mood, positivity about the task, and emotional 
expression were investigated, as were the relationships between the 
confederate's and the observer's ratings of the participants' emotional 
expression and the participants' self-ratings of emotional experience. 
According to the participants' self-ratings, there was a positive relationship 
between their expression of positive emotion and their experience of positive 
emotion (as measured by both percentage positivity about the task and task 
mood). Higher ratings of both mood and positivity about the task were 
associated with higher ratings of positive emotional expression. For the 
confederate and the observer, there were no significant relationships between 
their ratings of the participants' emotional expression and the participants' self-
rating of emotional experience. 
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ELLE illustrates the participants' intrapersonal relationships and provides 
a postulational theory to account for them. However, the direction of causality 
in these relationships is difficult to establish due to the dynamic nature of the 
interactions involved. It is difficult to disentangle the participants' emotional 
experience from their emotional expression. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
participants' positivity and mood were related to their expression of positive 
emotion. 
Future research could also attend more closely to the relationship between 
the participants' experience of emotion and the confederate and observer's 
ratings of her emotional expression. Although it seemed that the confederate 
and observer's ratings of the participant's positive emotional expression were 
not related to the participant's emotional experience, this may be a function of 
the design of the materials used in the experiment. The Making Friends Rating 
Scale completed by the confederate and the observer did not address the 
participants' emotional experience directly. Items were phrased as "How 
positive do you think the participant appeared?" not "How positive do you 
think the participant felt?", and might not have tapped the emotional 
experience of the participants. The word "appeared" was used in an attempt to 
elicit objective ratings of the participants' expression of positive emotion rather 
than the confederate and observer's subjective reactions to the participants' 
expressions. However, it could be argued that the wording of the items might 
have elicited ratings of skill along with intensity level ratings from the 
confederate and the observer. So, the question, "How encouraging do you think 
the participant appeared?" may have been interpreted as, "How skilled do you 
think the participant was at appearing encouraging?" The evaluative nature of 
the task may have elicited ratings of skill as much as levels of intensity, and the 
use of the word "appeared", rather than a direct question such as "How 
encouraging was the participant?" may have primed the raters to rate the 
participants' skill at "appearing" to express a certain emotional state. These 
issues surrounding the wording of the items in the Making Friends Rating Scale 
will need further work. 
In summary, the relationship between the participants' experience and 
expression of emotion is a complex one with possible feedback mechanisms 
operating in dyadic interaction. The critical point is that there is a direct and 
positive relationship between the participant's experienced and expressed 
emotion. Thus, hypothesis 1 was supported. 
4.2 Hypothesis 2 
Adolescents who express more positive emotion will be more liked by the 
confederate and the observer. 
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The positive correlations between all three raters' measures of liking and 
between their measures of emotional expression may suggest that either (a) 
raters measure how much they like someone by their judgements of emotion 
expression, or conversely, (b) they measure emotion expression by how much 
they like someone. Similarly, in the regression analyses reported in section 3.5, 
ratings of the expression of positive emotion predicted liking ratings for all 
three raters, but the reverse predictions will also be appropriate. While it is not 
possible to determine the direction of causality in the present results, there is a 
strong relationship between the expression of positive emotion and liking. 
So, the relationship predicted in hypothesis 2 was supported, although the 
directionality of the causal paths could not be firmly established. These results 
are similar to those of other researchers who have found that the expression of 
positive emotion is related to likability (e.g. Clark, et al., 1996; Jones, 1990; Jones 
& Pittman, 1982). 
4.3 Hypothesis 3 
Those participants in the neutral mood condition will self-regulate their 
emotions, making them positive during the interaction task. 
The mood induction procedure was obviously successful (see Figure 1). 
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After the mood induction procedures, those in the PMI group felt significantly 
more positive than those in the NMI group. However, after the interaction, 
those in the NMI group reported feeling as positive as those in the PMI group. 
After the interaction task, there was no significant difference in mood between 
the two mood induction groups. Clearly, some mechanism raised the mood of 
NMI participants. 
There are at least three competing plausible explanations for this mood 
elevation. First, the participants may have self-induced positive mood in order 
to make their experienced emotional state congruent with their expressed 
positive emotions (e.g., Baumeister, 1982; Hochschild, 1983; Parkinson, 1991; 
Wegner & Erber, 1993). Second, the interaction with the confederate may have 
been mood elevating in and of itself (e.g., Connell & Wellborn; 1990; Deci & 
Ryan, 1991). Third, the assumption, by the participants, that they had achieved 
their goal (getting the stranger to like them) may have produced positive 
emotion (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1990). 
Concerning the first explanation, because the participants all recognised 
that both experiencing and expressing positive emotion was an effective 
strategy for being liked (planning thought listing revealed 100% of statements 
about planned behaviors and feelings to be positive), it is not implausible to 
suggest that they might have self-induced positive mood. Since, in the study by 
Godfrey, et al.(1986), participants did carry out their planned strategies for 
ingratiation, it is plausible to suggest that participants in the present study also 
did so. There are two reasons that they might have self-induced positive mood. 
First, authenticity increases the credibility of the performance (Fiske & Taylor, 
1991; Hochschild, 1983; Jones & Pittman, 1982). Positive emotional experience 
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would have prevented the leaking of any emotion that might have been at odds 
with the positivity they were expressing, and thereby prevented the revelation 
of their ingratiation strategy. Second, as Gecas (1991) has suggested, the 
experience of authenticity is a powerful motivation in the development of the 
self-concept. It is more satisfying to be liked when one's behavior is congruent 
with the way one feels than if feeling and behavior are incongruent. To be liked 
when one is being authentic enhances the self-concept. Thus, not only does 
authenticity make the performance more credible, it also provides a positive 
experience of the self as meaningful and real. 
In terms of the second explanation, Connell and Wellborn (1990) and Deci 
and Ryan (1991) have suggested that relationships seem to offer satisfactions 
that are independent of the drive-based securities they often provide. 
Baumeister, Heatherton and Tice (1994) pointed to the arousing nature of social 
interaction, including such emotional reactions as excitement, nervousness, 
anxiety, sexual attraction, and many others. This may mean that the very act of 
interacting with another person in a non-threatening way may be mood 
enhancing. Participants may have become more positive simply as a function of 
interacting with another person. However, Geen (1991) concluded from a 
review of the empirical studies that have investigated the effects of the "mere 
presence" of others on people's affective states, that the arousal reported in 
these studies should be thought of as an aversive emotional state. He suggested 
that such arousal is partly due to apprehension over being evaluated by others. 
In the present study, statements from the interaction thought listing task 
illustrate this apprehension. Statements such as "I felt I was coming across a bit 
negative", "I don't want to sound stupid", "I felt she didn't like me" suggest 
that the interaction was not purely pleasurable. Additionally, developmental 
work by Kagan, et al.(1987) has found that about 33% of children are, by virtue 
of their temperament, aversive to social interaction. Therefore, it seems unlikely 
that the social interaction would have been pleasurable to all participants. 
Given that the present results show that all participants experienced an 
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elevation in mood during the interaction, the argument that mood was elevated 
as a function of social interaction is less plausible. 
With regard to the third explanation, Carver and Scheier's (1990) control 
theory model of goal striving would suggest that positive emotion is produced 
as a result of the rate of progress towards the goal being faster than anticipated. 
Participants may have experienced positive emotion as a result of progressing 
towards their goal of being liked. Other researchers have conceptualised 
emotions as arising from (a) the degree of goal attainment (Bandura, 1991a; 
Srull & Wyer, 1986), (b) anticipated goal attainment (Bandura, 1989), (c) "flow" 
experienced during goal striving (Csikczentmihalyi, 1990), (d) activated current 
concerns (Klinger, 1987) and (e) judgements of success or failure (Weiner, 1979). 
Participants may therefore have experienced an elevation in mood simply as a 
by-product of successful goal striving. Similarly, Geen (1991) suggested that 
successful social interaction increases feelings of personal competence and 
builds self esteem, producing positive emotion. 
However, as can be seen from Figure 1, there was no such mood elevation 
effect from the planning task. The successful accomplishment of that task did 
not elevate mood; on the contrary, it seemed to depress the participants' mood. 
If successful goal striving was enough to elevate mood, it might be expected 
that mood would be elevated after the accomplishment of the planning task. 
This was not the case. That is not to deny the different nature of the two tasks, 
but if the models of goal striving and the production of emotion are to hold 
generally, it is not unreasonable to expect some mood elevation during the 
planning task. While the prospect of the ingratiation task may have caused 
some negative emotion (e.g., anxiety) that could have dampened positive 
emotion, accounting for the lack of mood elevation, it seems unlikely that the 
anticipation would have been overwhelmingly negative. 
In summary, it seems unlikely that the positive mood induction 
experienced by the participants in the NMI condition was due either to the 
75 
social interaction itself, or to the effects of successful goal striving. While there 
may be other alternative explanations, the results of the present research lend 
support to hypothesis 3, that mood elevation during the interaction was the 
result of self-regulatory processes. 
4.4 Hypothesis 4 
There will be a positive relationship between participants' age and their 
expression of positive emotion. 
There was no effect of age on participants' ratings of their expression of 
positive emotion. All participants, regardless of age, rated their emotional 
expression equally. These findings might be a function of the tendency of 
people to rate themselves as more happy than the average person and more 
skilled than the average person (research summarised in Fiske & Taylor, 1991). 
The interesting part of the observation is that there were no age differences in 
this tendency. So it might be reasonable to conclude that the self-serving bias is 
a phenomenon that, at least during adolescence, is not a function of age. In 
other words, this bias has been firmly established in children's behavior by 
adolescence. 
However, the confederate and the observer both rated the age categories 
differentially in terms of their emotional expressiveness. As age of participants 
increased, so did the confederate and the observer's ratings of emotional 
expression. There are a number of competing explanations that might account 
for the age differential in the confederate and observer's ratings. First, it might 
be that there was an expectancy of increasing emotional expression in both of 
those raters. DePaulo (1992) pointed out that, when perceivers are trying to 
distinguish among the many possible interpretations of a particular 
communication, they can draw from base-rate information about the person 
and the situation. One piece of information that might aid in interpretation is 
the age of the actor. The perceiver might assume that older children are more 
skilled at emotional expression than younger children, having more knowledge, 
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practice and experience, and are able thereby to create an expectancy of this 
before making her judgement. Experimental evidence supports the notion that 
older children are more skilled at the expression of emotion than younger 
children (e.g., Saarni, 1990), and the social cognition literature is replete with 
evidence of peoples' expectancies about various issues; for example, Gerber 
(1993) showed that participants used social schemata to guide social interaction, 
with stereotypical expectancies being displayed in judgement tasks. Therefore, 
it is not unreasonable to suggest that the confederate and observer's ratings 
were influenced by their expectancy that older children would be more skilled 
at emotional expression than younger children. 
Second, an alternative explanation for the relationship between the 
expression of positive emotion and age is that, since the confederate was a 23-
year old adult, the older children felt more at ease with her and thus freer to 
express emotion. Many of the older participants were in the process of planning 
their university careers and had an interest in tertiary study in common with 
the confederate. The phenomenon of ingroup bias has been well established (for 
a review of the research, see Myers, 1993), and as early adolescence signals the 
beginning of the drive for individuation and identity (Erikson, 1968) with its 
accompanying peer group affiliation (Connell, Stroobant, Sinclair, Connell & 
Rogers, 1975), it is not implausible that the younger participants might have felt 
expressively inhibited by a stranger from a different age/status group. The 
older participants may have felt less inhibited with the confederate since they 
were closer in age and status. 
Thus, the particular confederate might have imposed constraints on the 
expression of emotion in younger participants. If the confederate had been a 
peer of the younger participants, it is possible that the age/ emotional 
expression relationship might not have been present. In fact, the relationship 
might have been a negative one. The older participants may have felt inhibited 
by a younger stranger, in contrast to the present situation where the younger 
participants may have felt inhibited by an older stranger. 
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Third, Colvin's (1993) work showed that the development of identity 
facilitates judgability, and increasing identity resolution results in less self-
consciousness (Adams, et al., 1987) and more self-confidence (Helbing, 1984). 
Consequently, the older participants may have been more comfortable in 
expressing emotion than younger participants. However, the expectancy effect 
may still have been present in the age-differential ratings of emotional 
expression, but rather than being based on expectancies of skill differences, it 
would have been based on expectancies of differences in self-confidence, self-
consciousness and psychological adjustment. The results, and explanations of 
the results, support Hypothesis 4. 
4.5 Hypothesis 5 
There will be a positive relationship between participants' age and the liking 
ratings of the confederate and observer. 
While the significant differences between raters for liking ratings were few, 
the confederate and the observer both rated the oldest children higher than any 
other age category. It is not inconceivable that the confederate and the 
observer's preference for the older children might also be influenced by theories 
of similarity in personal relationships. It has been found that similarity between 
people predicts their liking for each other (Chapdelaine, Kenny & La Fontana, 
1994; Deutsch, Sullivan, Sage & Basile, 1991; Nesler, Storr & Tedeschi, 1993). 
The confederate and the observer may have identified the older participants as 
being closer to their own age and status groups, and therefore liked them more. 
Sharma & Kaur (1991) showed, in a study investigating similarity and liking 
between female 12-14 year-olds and female 21-23 year-olds, that there was a 
main effect of age for liking the other person and rating her to be warm. This 
liking judgement may have positively influenced the ratings of positive 
emotional expression by the confederate and the observer, because as their 
liking increased, so their expectancy of positive emotional expression may have 



























Figure 5. Illustration of the different paths from participants' increasing age to 
confederate and observer's increasing liking ratings. 
In summary, Hypothesis 5 was conditionally supported in that there was only 
one significant difference between age groups for the confederate and 
observer's liking ratings. 
4.6 Hypothesis 6 
There will be less consensus between the ratings of younger adolescents and 
the confederate and observer, than between those of older adolescents and 
the confederate and observer. 
When participants were divided into their age categories, there were no 
significant differences between raters for liking ratings (Figure 2). However, 
Figure 3 shows that the older participants were more accurate than the younger 
participants in their judgements of their own emotional expression. That is, 
there was no significant difference between self-ratings of emotional expression 
and others' ratings of emotional expression for the oldest age category, but the 
difference between self-ratings and others' ratings became larger as the age 
category became younger. 
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Using Funder's (1995) RAM as a suitable framework for interpreting 
these age differences, four factors need to be addressed. Funder proposed that 
there were two intrapersonal factors for the judge (the person making the 
judgement), namely detection and utilisation, and two intrapersonal factors for 
the target (the person being judged), namely relevance and availability. In the 
present study, the participant and the confederate take the part of both judge 
and target. In order to make her rating of the participant's emotional 
expressiveness, the confederate would have been acting as the judge with the 
participant as the target. In order to make a prediction about how much she 
thought the confederate liked her, the participant would have been acting as the 
judge with the confederate as the target. However, as illustrated in ELLE, the 
participant's prediction is dependant, in part, on the outcome of the 
confederate's judgement of her. Therefore, the intrapersonal factors relating to 
both judge and target are possible sources of age differences. 
First, as targets, the relevance of the participants' emotional expression to 
their emotional experience and the availability of emotional cues may be a 
function of age. The increasing: ability to self-regulate emotion (Labouvie-Vief, 
et al., 1989); awareness of their own emotional states (Hauser & Safyer, 1994); 
self-confidence (Helbing, 1984); willingness to self-disclose to others with a 
related decrease in self-consciousness (Adams, et al., 1987); and psychological 
adjustment (Colvin, 1993) of adolescents as they get older will all contribute to 
the relevance of emotional expression to emotional experience and to the 
availability of emotional cues. 
Second, as judges, perceptiveness and the utilisation of available cues may 
also be a function of age. As adolescents increase their knowledge of others' 
perspectives and become less egocentric, their ability to perceive emotional cues 
in others will increase (Barenboim, 1981; MacLennan & Jackson, 1985; 
O'Mahoney, 1986). Similarly, the development of a coherent personal identity 
will result in fewer biases in the interpretation of those cues. An increased 
knowledge about the meanings of emotional cues, increased confidence in their 
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judgements and a more accurate theory about themselves will help to correct 
the cognitive biases that could lead to misinterpretations of the emotional cues 
provided by others. 
For the various plausible intra- and inter-personal explanations outlined above, 
Hypothesis 5 was supported. 
4.7 Conclusions 
From the results of this study, an integrated model (ELLE) was developed 
that incorporated the well-known models of Kenny (1994), Cappella (1993) and 
Funder (1995). ELLE depicts the considerable number of cognitive, emotional 
and behavioral processes involved in an ingratiation task, and relates them by 
uni- and bi-directional paths. While ELLE apparently illustrates these processes 
as happening in a serial fashion, it is more likely that many happen in parallel 
and simultaneously. Undoubtedly, difficulties with establishing the direction of 
causal paths is due in part to this complexity. What may be required is a model 
that incorporates reciprocal, bi-directional influences as a matter of course, e.g., 
a dynamic systems model. 
A summary of the processes involved in the ingratiation task must 
include the following: In an attempt to infer what the confederate thought of 
them, participants directly observed their own thoughts, emotions and 
behavior, and by assuming that others see them the same way that they do, 
they made inferences from those observations about the confederate's 
perceptions of them. In addition, participants looked to the confederate for 
feedback about their behavior. This study adds a third dimension to the dyadic 
situation, that is, the self-regulation of emotional states and expressions. The 
present research proposes that ingratiation strategies might have elevated the 
participants' mood, either directly by the self-induction of positive mood or 
indirectly via the use of display rules, and thereby influenced participants' 
liking ratings. When it came to ingratiating themselves with the confederate, 
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adolescents manipulated their emotional states in order to match their 
emotional experience with their emotional expression. This happened either 
directly by positive mood induction via cognitive processes, or indirectly by the 
adoption of display rules that provided facial feedback to emotion. 
ELLE clarifies the relationship between experienced and expressed positive 
emotion during the ingratiation task, integrating the work of researchers who: 
have found that people attempt to make their experienced emotion as 
congruent with their expressed emotion as possible (Hochschild, 1983; 
Parkinson, 1991; Wegner & Erber, 1992); have found that people look for cues to 
others' perceptions of them within themselves (Kenny, 1994); have found that 
people look for cues to others' perceptions of them within their dyadic partners 
(Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979); have developed a model of person-perception 
accuracy (the RAM model of Funder, 1995); espouse the facial feedback 
hypothesis (Adelman & Zajonc, 1989; Cappella, 1993; Hess, et al.,1992); and 
have investigated the phenomenon of behavioral matching (Cappella, 1997; 
Gergen & Wishnov, 1965; Newtson & Czerlinsky, 1974; Schlenker & Goldman, 
1982, ). 
The effects of age on the processes contained in ELLE have been 
demonstrated in two ways, namely that participants' age was positively related 
to their emotional expression and their age was negatively related to their 
accuracy about the confederate and the observer's affective ratings of them. 
Whether these effects were due to the intrapersonal factors related to the 
participants (e.g., self-disclosure, perceptiveness, confidence, psychological 
adjustment) or the intrapersonal factors related to the confederate and the 
observer (e.g., expectancy and/ or similarity effects) are questions that are 
unlikely to be answered, since it is likely that a combination of these factors 
contributed simultaneously to the relationships that were demonstrated. 
While there may well be other explanatory theories that could account for 
the results of this study, it is considered that the explanatory breadth, simplicity 
and analogy of ELLE makes it an attractive option. These three evaluative 
criteria have been proposed by Thagard (1992) as suitable for comparing 
competing theories. 
4.8 Limitations of the present research 
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There are a number of limitations in the present research that affect the 
generalisability of the findings, for example, sampling biases . While this is the 
case with any research, it is useful to point out those limitations that have been 
identified in order to inform future research in the area. In addition, there are 
limitations in the design of this study that may have affected the findings, for 
example, possible confounding variables and the cross-sectional nature of the 
study. 
While the age group chosen for this study may limit the generalisability of 
the findings, there is an obvious sampling bias in terms of sex and socioeconomic 
status. These three demographic variables have been shown to impact on 
psychological functioning in a number of areas, and may well have influenced 
the findings. First, the particular developmental tasks inherent in adolescence 
might have produced the findings, rather than age itself. Although infrences 
were made about their existence, this study could not identify the underlying 
factors that produced the observed age differences. A sample of children in 
middle-childhood may not have demonstrated the relationships with age 
produced in this work. Second, females have been shown to be more 
emotionally aware and expressive than males (Dunn, Bretherton & Munn, 1987; 
Sarni, 1989). However, any differences between boys and girls are more likely 
to be mean-differences rather than differences in the correlations. It can 
reasonably be expected that the developmental sequence would obtain in a 
sample of adolescent boys, but the intensity of emotion expression might be 
less. Additionally, the fact that this was a same-sex interaction and not a 
between-sex interaction might have affected the intensity of emotional 
expression. Third, low-income children have been shown to be less prosocial 
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than middle-income children in some studies (e.g., Raviv & Bar-Tal, 1981) and 
more prosocial in other studies (e.g., Knight & Kagan, 1977). The current work 
involved only middle-upper income children and, therefore, more research is 
needed in order to establish the relationship between socio-economic status and 
social functioning. 
One of the possible confounding variables in the present study was the age of 
the confederate. It has been suggested in the discussion that the younger 
children might have been emotionally inhibited by an interaction with someone 
far removed in age and status, whereas, for the older children, this difference 
might be greatly reduced. It could be that, if the participants had all interacted 
with an early adolescent, the results might have been quite different, with the 
older participants being inhibited by the difference. It remains for future 
research to examine this possibility. However, the present research does offer 
an insight into how adolescents interact differentially with an adult stranger. 
Considering that, during adolescence, children are likely to be interacting with 
a number of adults, for example, teachers, coaches or employers, the present 
findings offer some illumination of the interactions that might happen in any 
ingratiation situation between an adolescent and an adult. 
The cross-sectional design of the study raises the question as to whether the 
developmental sequence identified (that children become more emotionally 
expressive as they get older) might be a function of individual differences 
between the children. Perhaps this group of 17-18 year olds were particularly 
expressive at the age of 11-12, and that this group of 11-12 year olds will be 
particularly inexpressive when they are 17-18. It would be necessary to conduct 
a longitudinal study in order to confirm that the developmental sequence, does, 
in fact, exist. 
4.9 Implications of the present research and directions for 
future research 
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Directions for future research can be recommended from three different 
sources in the present research. One source is related to the alternative 
explanations generated in the discussion. Ambiguity of results may demand first, 
replication and/ or second, more fine-grained investigation of the empirical 
phenomena in question. The third source is the possible application of the findings 
of this research, conceptually or practically. 
In terms of the ambiguity of results, two particular issues are raised by the 
discussion section of this thesis. First, ELLE needs to be tested under conditions 
where the emotional expressions of the confederate are predominantly 
negative, in order to further clarify the effects of this variable on the dyadic 
system. It might be established that the self-induction of positive emotion 
would override the effects of that negative expression, or alternatively, that the 
emotion content of the whole system would become negatively valenced. 
Second, more research is needed to explicate the cause of the mood elevation 
during the interaction task. While it was argued that hypothesis 3 (that 
participants would self-induce positive mood) could be supported, more fine-
grained analysis of this phenomenon is necessary to make the relationship 
between ingratiation and mood explicit. 
In terms of applications of the findings, one conceptual implication and one 
practical application are considered. First, one of the conceptual implications of 
the present research concerns the difficulties in making explicit the direction of 
the causal processes within a system. Thus, rather than insisting that the causal 
mechanisms contained in a system transmit influences in a particular direction, 
it may be more productive to characterise those mechanisms in terms of their 
contribution to the functioning of the system as a whole. 
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Woodward (1989) has examined the limitations of the standard approach to 
scientific explanation which appeals to the causal mechanisms involved in the 
production of behavior. He cites examples of physical systems with many 
interacting processes where, "it is often hopeless to try to understand the 
behavior of the whole system by tracing each individual process. Instead one 
needs to find a way of representing what the system does on the whole, or on 
the average, which abstracts from such specific causal detail" (pp. 362-363). In 
the present research, the complex interactions between the processes described 
in Figures 4 and 5 make attempts to trace the direction of the causal paths 
involved in the system extremely difficult. While there is evidence for the 
effects of cognition on emotion ( e.g., Lazarus (1982) appraisal theory of 
emotion), the effects of behavior on emotion (e.g., the facial feedback 
hypothesis), the effects of emotion on behavior (e.g. Baumeister, et al., 1994), 
and the effects of emotion on cognition (e.g., mood congruency effects), 
questions remain about causal order in these causal paths. 
It may be that it is enough to explicate and understand the causal 
mechanisms contained in a model like ELLE and be able to make general 
predictions about how the system, as a whole, will operate when one or other of 
the causal mechanisms changes, rather than attempt to determine the causal 
order of the mechanisms. Dynamical systems theory, as explicated by Kellert 
(1993), provides a means of modeling any dynamical system without having to 
undertake the impossible task of accounting for the direction of every causal 
mechanism. The attraction of dynamical systems theory for psychologists is the 
ability to foresee and understand changes in the overall behavior of a system 
rather than having to predict the exact value of some property of the system. It 
may be enough to know the constituents of the system, without precisely 
tracing their causal paths, because a core assumption of systems theory is that a 
change in any one of the constituents will change the behavior of the system as 
a whole. In relation to the present research, an important line of future work 
would involve establishing the effects of positive emotion expression on liking, 
rather than attempting to determine the causal order of processes like cognition, 
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emotional experience and emotion expression. By accepting that all variables 
interact with each other in complex and sometimes unpredictable ways, it is 
still possible to understand the system in terms of its properties and its 
functioning, providing foci for intervention when the system becomes unstable. 
While the application of dynamical systems theory to psychology is still in its 
infancy ( e.g., Ayers, 1997), and it is not without its problems ( e.g., Kincanon & 
Powel, 1995), there may be valuable lessons to be learned and applied by 
considering the methodological and conceptual issues involved in dynamical 
systems theory. In any case, the use of diverse methodologies will give 
psychology a better chance of developing complementary understandings of 
the phenomena under investigation. In sum, one sensible approach to modeling 
will be to lay out the causal mechanisms contained in a particular system 
without an emphasis on establishing causal order. 
Second, there are potential implications for clinical psychology in this 
research. Clinical populations tend to have more interpersonal difficulties than 
nonclinical populations (Bosch, Schlebusch & Wessels, 1987; Claiborn & 
Lichtenberg, 1989) and difficulties with the self-regulation of emotion (Parker, 
Taylor, Bagby & Acklin, 1993; Shearin & Linehan, 1994; Telch, 1997). Clinicians' 
efforts are generally concentrated on providing clients with the skills to regulate 
negative emotion (Andreoli, et al., 1995; Linehan & Kehrer, 1993), and little 
attention is paid to the induction of positive emotional states. If it is assumed 
that the expression of positive emotion (particularly when it is matched by 
emotional experience) makes people likable, then there is some justification for 
teaching clients with psychological difficulties to self-induce positive emotion 
in order to feel better and be more effective interpersonally. While it may be 
argued that experimentally induced mood is short-lived (Seibert & Ellis, 1991), 
future research could help to develop methods that would result in longer-
lasting changes. For example, Seibert and Ellis (1991) found that the more self-
referencing and/ or self-evaluating a mood induction technique is, the more 
likely an intense and meaningful emotional mood state will be produced. It is 
87 
hoped that future research will identify factors that would make induced mood 
last longer. 
Relatedly, too little attention has been given to the study of positive 
emotions during adolescence (Wagner, 1996) and clearly more research in this 
area is needed. Researchers are becoming increasingly aware that poor 
relationships in adolescence are predictive of social incompetence and 
maladjustment in adulthood (Cassidy & Lynn, 1991; Cole, et al., 1989; Feehan, 
McGee, Williams, & Nada-Raja, 1995; Rotheram-Borus, 1989; Schonert & 
Kimberly, 1993). The available literature tends to concentrate on negative 
emotion in adolescence rather than positive emotion. More fine-grained 
investigations of the variables contributing to adolescent positive emotion (e.g., 
identity development, emotional repertoire, cognitive development) are needed 
in order to understand the constituents of the social systems of which 
adolescents are a part. 
While the present research has something to say about positive emotion in 
adolescence within a non-clinical population, future research with a clinical 
population of adolescents is necessary in order to establish whether there are 
differences in system functioning between the two populations. It may be that 
there are psychological mechanisms at work in clinical populations that 
prevent/ modify the self-induction of positive emotion. 
The present research has supported a number of hypotheses about the 
experience and expression of positive emotion during ingratiation among 
adolescents. It is hoped that it will also encourage further research in the area of 
adolescent social functioning. Gaining a better understanding of this area, and 
designing possible interventions for those who find social interaction 
particularly difficult, are two endeavors that deserve considered attention. 
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Appendix A. Information sheet and Consent Form 
Dear Parent and Student, 
Project Title: The Likability of Strangers 
I am conducting research for my Master's Degree at the University of 
Canterbury. I am concurrently completing the postgraduate Diploma of Clinical 
Psychology at the same institution. 
I am conducting a research project that looks at the development of children's 
ability to interact socially. Investigating the way that children develop 
knowledge about social interactions (in detail) gives us a better understanding 
of how this ability develops. 
I would like to include your daughter in my study. Gillian Heald and members 
of the staff at Rangi Ruru School have reviewed the project, and they believe 
that it poses no threat to your daughter's well-being. The project has also been 
reviewed and passed by the University of Canterbury's Human Ethics 
Committee. In order to include your child, I need your written consent and her 
consent (see consent form). 
In this study, each girl will be seen individually by myself for an initial period 
of time and will then be introduced to an adult female whom she has not met 
before. She will have a 5-minute interaction with the stranger, which will be 
videotaped. At various stages during the experiment, each girl will be asked to 
write down a list of her thoughts and feelings. 
If at any time your daughter expresses a desire not to continue, she will be free 
to return to her classroom. The research literature suggests that young people 
generally enjoy taking part in experiments of this kind, and I would like to 
assure you that your daughter will receive only positive feedback during the 
experiment. 
Of course, all information that I gather will be kept confidential. Biographical 
details will be stored separately from the experimental data and no biographical 
details will be used in publications that may arise as the result of this research. 
It is important for you to know that it is the performance of the group as a 
whole that is to be reported, not your daughter's individual contribution. 
If you would agree to allow your daughter to participate in this study and she 
would like to, please sign the consent form below and ask her to sign it. I also 
require the biographical details that accompany the consent form. I would 
greatly appreciate your reply by Monday 18th August. Simply return the form 
to your daughter's form tutor or the school office and I will collect it. 
Thank you for your help with this project. If you have any questions about the 
study, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
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CONSENT FORM 
I have read and understood the description of the project "The Likability of 
Strangers". I have discussed the project with my daughter and believe that she 
understands it. On this basis, I agree to allow my child to participate in the 
study, and I consent to publication of the results of the project with the 
understanding that anonymity will be preserved. I understand also that my 
daughter may withdraw from the study at any time, including the withdrawal 
of any information provided. 
Parental consent 
I agree to allow my daughter, __________________ _ 
to participate in the study described above. 
I do not agree to allow my daughter, _______________ _ 
to participate in the study described above. 
Signed: ___________ _ Date: "'-------
(Parent) 
(Please print) 
Your daughter's full name: ___________________ _ 
Your daughter's Birth Date:~-------------------
Student's Consent 
!, _______________ _ agree to participate in the 
study described above. 
do not agree to participate 
in the study described above. 
Signed· _____________ _ Date_·-------
(Student) 
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Appendix C. Planning Thoughts List 
Planning Thoughts List 
I am interested in the plans you are making in order to get the stranger to like 
you. I want you to think about what you will say and do, and what feelings 
inside you will help to make her like you, for example, being sad, angry, happy 
or excited. Simply list the plans as they occur to you, the first one in the first 
box, the second in the second box and so on. Please put only one plan in each 
box. Don't worry about grammar or spelling, just write down your plans. You 
will be given 2 minutes to complete this task Don't worry about filling all the 
boxes - I've given you more than I think you will need. Please be honest (there 
are no right or wrong plans). 
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Appendix D. Interaction Thoughts List 
Interaction Thoughts List 
I now want to know what you were thinking and feeling during your time with 
Meg. Simply list the thoughts and feelings as you remember them, the first one 
in the first box, the second in the second box and so on. Please put only one 
thought or feeling in each box. Don't worry about grammar or spelling, just 
vvrite dnwn your thoughts and feelings. You ·will be given 2 minutes to 
complete this task Don't worry about filling all the boxes -I've given you more 
than I think you will need. Please be honest (there are no right or wrong 
thoughts and feelings) 
Appendix E. Making Friends Rating Scale 
Making Friends Rating Scale 
(Participant) 
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Please think about the time you spent with the stranger and answer the 
following questions. Choose a number between 1 (not at all) and 7 (very much) 
to answer each question and put a circle around the number you choose. 
Not at all Very much 
1. How much do you think the stranger liked you? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. How much do you think you smiled? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. How friendly do you think you appeared? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. How natural do you think you appeared? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. How encouraging do you think you appeared? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. How much do you think you talked? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. How happy do you think you appeared? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. How warm do you think you appeared? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. How much eye contact do you think you made? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. How positive do you think you appeared? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix F. Complete Script for Procedure 
Hi,--- come in. (Show her to her seat). 
I'm Fran and I'm going to be doing the research with you today. I'm doing a 
Master's degree at the University of Canterbury and also training to be a clinical 
psychologist. What class are you missing now? What other courses are you 
doing? We are going to be doing a variety of different tasks today and I hope 
that you find them interesting and fun. 
The first thing I want to do is for you to think about how you are feeling right 
now. I have a mood thermometer that goes from very negative (the worst you 
ever felt in your life) to very positive (the best you ever felt) with neutral (not 
particularly good or bad) in the middle. Make a line across the thermometer to 
show how you are feeling right now. Good. I will be asking you to mark a 
11thermometer" another 3 times during our time together. Each time you do it, I 
want you to record your feelings at 1HAT moment, without thinking about 
how you felt the last time. 
In a few minutes, I will introduce you to someone whom you have not met 
before. What I want you to do is try and get her to like you. She doesn't know 
that you are trying to get her to like you - all she knows is that she will spend 5 
minutes getting to know you. So I don't want you to say anything about what 
you're trying to do. You will have 5 minutes with her, and I will be videotaping 
your meeting so that I can watch it later. I'm interested to see what sorts of 
things you do to get her to like you. We all do things to get people to like us, 
but most of the time, they're automatic and quite difficult to put into words. So 
now I'm going to ask you to take a few minutes and think about how you will 
go about getting her to like you. I want you to think about what you will say 
and do, and what feelings inside you will help to make her like you, for 
for you to record your plans. Please read the instructions at the top of this page 
and then I will give you 2 minutes to fill in the boxes. Now I would like you to 
mark a thermometer with how you are feeling right now. 
Neutral Mood Induction: Let's take a little time to settle into this. As a way 
of familiarising yourself with this room, I would like you to describe the 
room in as much detail as you can. Please name all of the things you can see 
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and tell me how many there are of each. OR Positive Mood Induction: Let's 
take a little time to settle into this. I want you to tell me something that makes 
you very happy, something that really makes you feel good. (subject gives 
example). That's right, ......... is really fun/ exciting. You feel really good 
when ........ Now I want you to think about how good you feel when ........ Think 
really hard about ............ Tell me all the good feelings you have 
when ......... Now I would like you to mark the thermometer again with how 
you are feeling right now. (Note change of mood - if no change, repeat 
induction and mood rating). 
(Fetch confederate)-- This is Meg, Meg, this is--. I'm going to switch 
the videotape on and make sure it's working. Good. See you in 5 minutes. 
(Re-enter room, switch off video). Thanks Meg. (confederate leaves). 
Now, for the last time, I would like you to mark the thermometer again. 
Thank you. There are two more things to do before we finish. 
The first one is for you to fill out this questionnaire (Making Friends Rating 
Scale). Read the instructions at the top and then answer the questions. Now I 
want to know what you were thinking and feeling while you were with Meg. 
Read the instructions at the top of this form, and I will give you 2 minutes to fill 
in the boxes. Thank you. 
Well -- that's it! But before you go, there are 2 things I want to check out 
with you. First, I need to ask you not to discuss what we did today with anyone 
who hasn't been yet. As you can imagine, if they did know, it might interfere 
with the way they might behave during the experiment. As soon as the whole 
experiment is finished you can talk about it with anyone. I will also be sending 
you a letter explaining exactly what I was hoping to achieve. Second, how did 
it go with Meg? It's important that you leave here feeling good. It has meant a 
lot to me that you took the time and trouble to help me with my work, and I 
want you to know that you have made a really valuable contribution. I hope 
that you found it interesting and fun. 
Appendix G. Examples of thoughts and feelings from planning 
and interaction thought listing tasks 
Examples of thoughts are presented in 6 categories: 
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1. Positive planning behaviors: Smiling; looking at her; making eye contact; 
involving her; asking about her; talking; laughing; don't fold arms; make her 
feel at ease; good body language; don't slouch; crack jokes; don't show off. 
2. Postive planning feelings: Confident, interested/ not bored; happy; warm; 
friendly; open/not secretive/not shy /not reserved; relaxed/not 
nervous/laid back/ casual/ don't worry/ not afraid; welcoming; positive/ not 
negative; cheerful/ not grumpy /bubbly/ not depressed; myself/ natural; 
good feeling; encouraging/ not critical/ not judgemental; polite; 
approachable; comfortable; helpful; kind. 
3. Positive thoughts about the task: Pleasant person; cheerful person; I wanted 
to carry on; she looked interested; we got on well; she was encouraging; we 
chatted a lot; I thought of heaps of things to say; it was fun. 
4. Negative thoughts about the task: I seemed a bit too eager; I'm a really 
boring person; I felt I was coming across a bit negative; I don't want to 
sound stupid; I felt she didn't like me; what am I going to say next; I felt I 
talked too much; what happens if she doesn't start talking. 
5. Positive feelings about the task: Happy; encouraged; fine; relaxed/ not 
nervous; interested; enjoying myself; curious; excited; positive; comfortable; 
calm; assured; pleased. 
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6. Negative feelings about the task: Self conscious; nervous; uncomfortable; 
unnatural; embarrassed; flustered; scared; awkward; edgy; anxious; 
worried; unsure; shy. 
Appendix H. Debriefing Information 
Debriefing information 
When we are interacting with other people, emotional skills are called into 
play. The range of necessary emotional skills includes (among many other 
things) the ability to change our feelings. 
I think that the actions we take in order to achieve social goals (e.g. getting 
to know a stranger) work better when our feelings match those actions. For 
example, in order to make a new friend, we need to feel positive. On the other 
hand, in order to be stand up to the bully in the playground, some negative 
feeling (for example, feeling that the other person is being unfair) may be 
needed to help us to achieve that goal. 
People who have psychological problems often have difficulties when 
interacting with other people. If I can show that changing our feelings to match 
the social goals we have helps us to have better social interactions it may be 
possible to teach people how to achieve this. 
During our experiment, I measured your mood (how you were feeling) a 
number of times. For some of you, I got you into a happy mood by talking 
about something that made you happy. For others I got you into a neutral mood 
(neither positive nor negative) by having you describe the room. Then I got you 
to rate your mood after you had planned your encounter with the stranger. This 
was to see whether you put yourself into a positive mood so that you could 
achieve the goal of getting her to like you. I also got the stranger (and 2 other 
people who watched the videotapes) to rate how effective the interaction was. 
When I do the statistics on all of the information I have, I will be looking at 
the average scores of each group to see if being in a positive mood does make 
social interactions better. 
